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INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN WILDLIFE: HOW
EFFECTIVE IS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
TREATY?
International trade in wildlife is a surprisingly lucrative busi-
ness. Annual global trade averages of two to five billion dollars' rank
the trade in wildlife and wildlife products as one of the world's larg-
est industries.2 Estimates of illegal exports alone total one-half bil-
lion dollars per year3 and boast profit margins higher than those of
the illicit drug industry.4 The diversity of this international market is
1. Interviews with Linda McMahan, Director of Trade Record Analysis of Flora and
Fauna in Commerce-(U.S.A.) (TRAFFIC), in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 3 and 6, 1984).
"TRAFFIC is a program of World Wildlife Fund, and is part of an international TRAFFIC
network cooperating with the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources." See infra note 35. TRAFFIC monitors "the international trade in wild plants and
animals," gathers data and analyzes wildlife trade statistics. 5 TRAFFIC, 1983 Newsletter No.
1, at 2.
2. See Rea, The Fortune Directory of the Largest US. Industrial Corporations, FORTUNE,
May 2, 1983, at 228.
3. Hanley, Illegal Trade in Wildlife Threatens Many Species, Hartford Courant, July 25,
1983, at A7, col. I. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFW) estimates that illegal
imports into the United States alone currently total $100 million per year. Illegal Trade in
Wildlife Goes Unchecked, 5 Focus, 1983 Newsletter No. 5, at 1. World Wildlife Fund (WWF)
estimates that over one-third of the annual global trade of all wildlife and wildlife derivatives is
illegal. Id.
4. Wildlife trade can generate profits ranging from 300 to 400 percent. For example, the
horn of the Northern white rhinoceros (Ceratotherium simum cottonO yields between twenty to
fifty dollars per horn for the poacher who kills the animal in the wild. The average horn of a
full grown specimen weighs anywhere between twenty to fifty pounds, depending upon its age.
The horn's value will rise to approximately $250 per pound upon reaching a major exporting
city, and eventually will bring up to $1,000 per pound in the pharmacies of the Far East, where
it is believed to have medicinal value, and up to $13,000 in North Yemen, where young men
wear rhino horn daggers as ceremonial signs of maturity. Cowell, On Foot Patrol in Rhinoceros
Country, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1983, at 2, col. 1; Shabecoff, Yemen Acts to Stem the Trade in
Rhino Horns, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1982, at 24, col. 1; Cowell, Increased Slaughter of Rhinos
Feared, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1982, at 3, col. 1; Jaynes, Yemeni Wealth Decimates Rhinos, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 8, 1981, at E20, col. 4.
Profit margins of this proportion are not limited to rhinoceros horns, but are representa-
tive of those attending most wildlife products. To illustrate, a single bald eagle (Haliaeetus
leucocephalus) can bring up to $1,000 on the black market. One ordinary leopard skin coat can
sell for up to $20,000. The gall bladder of the American grizzly bear (Ursus arctos horiblis)
sells for $300 an ounce in San Francisco's Chinatown and the Far East. Exotic birds are per-
haps the most expensive class of specimens. For example, a single Hyacinth macaw (order
Psittaciformes) is valued at up to $5,000; an Asian cockatoo $8,000; and a Blackpalm cockatoo
between $10,000 to $20,000. See Sand, Stop This Shameful Traffic, NATUROPA 56, 57 (No.
34/35) (Council of Eur.) (1980); The Hunt for Illegal Skins and Furs, Bus. WK., Mar. 7, 1983,
at 70; Boucher, The Wildlife Trade, ATLANTIC, Mar., 1983, at 10; Tonfexis, Adventures in the
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extensive, and the demand for wildlife products steadily increases
pressure on a limited supply of resources.5
Efforts to regulate and manage wildlife trade have historically
been either non-existent, illusory or at best minimally effective stop
gap measures. 6 Consequently, over-exploitation has resulted in the
extinction or near-extinction of innumerable plants and animals, and
currently there is no reasonable indication that this pattern will
change.7 An extensive body of evidence' strongly suggests that the
trend toward widespread extinction is actually escalating at an inor-
Skin Trade, TIME, May 28, 1984, at 82; Shabecoff, Warrants Issued for Slayers of Eagles Over
Eight States, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1983, at 18, col. 1.
5. Wildlife trade is as varied as it is extensive. For example, scientific and medical re-
search firms create a tremendous demand for many species, perhaps the most noteworthy of
which are primates. Approximately 250 great apes are traded annually, and in 1977 the United
States alone imported over 28,000 primates. Zoos and museums are also voracious collectors of
live specimens. United States and Canadian zoos alone add to their collections approximately
760,000 specimens per year. Personal collections outside of zoos also account for large
volumes of trade. Over seven million live birds were shipped internationally in 1975. Ameri-
cans alone imported over seven million cacti between 1977 and 1978, over 250 million tropical
fish in 1979, and over 700,000 live birds in 1981. In 1982 United States wildlife imports in-
cluded five million live animals, five million furs, 958,000 leather skins and 943,000 reptile
skins. Often one particular species is the subject of an immense volume of trade. Between 1967
and 1972, for example, the United Kingdom imported over 1.2 million specimens of one spe-
cies, the Mediterranean spurthighed tortoise. Wild cat furs imported into Europe totalled al-
most one million skins in 1976, and the tonnage of African ivory exports to Europe that year
represented approximately 700,000 elephants. See generally P. EHRLICH, EXTINCTION: THE
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF SPECIES 119-126 (1981); T. IN-
SKIPP & S. WELLS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN WILDLIFE 27-75 (1979); Tonfexsis, supra note
1.
6. [E]arly wildlife legislation was concerned with welfare (e.g., the UK Cruelty to
Animals Act 1876), the control of agricultural pests (e.g., the UK Destructive Im-
ported Animals Act 1932), the control of hunting and the taking of trophies (e.g., the
Wild Animals and Birds Protection Enactment 1925 of the Federated Malay States,
the Ugandan Game Ordinance 1926 and the Kenyan Game Ordinance 1937) and the
setting up of national parks and game reserves (e.g., the Kenya National Parks Ordi-
nance 1945 and the 1926 Act founding the Kruger National Park in South Africa);
the early legislation concerning national parks did little except ensure that European
colonists could get their hunting trophies.
INSKIPP & WELLS, supra note 5, at 4.
7. Examples of species that have become extinct in North America since 1600 include
the Eastern elk (Cervus canadensis canadensis), Queen Charlotte Island caribou (Rangifer
tarandus dawsoni), Eastern bison (Bison bison pensylvanicus), Badlands bighorn sheep (Ovis
canadensis anduboni), Southern California kit fox (Vulpes macrotis macrotis), Stellar's sea cow
(Hydrodamalis steller), Atlantic gray whale (Eschricbhtins gibbonus), six species of wolves (or-
der Canis lupus), Passenger pigeon (Ectopistes migratorius), Carolina parakeet (Conuropsis
carolinensis), Labrador duck (Camptorhynchus labradorium), and Palas cormorant
(Phalacroedax perspillatus). Most of these species disappeared in the twentieth century, and
comprise only a small list from one geographic region.
Examples of species in immediate danger of extinction include the Whooping crane (Grus
americana), which were reduced to 21 by 1941 and are now approaching 150; the Northern
white rhinoceros, which have been reduced to approximately 1,000; and the Mountain gorilla,
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dinate rate.9 Over 600 species of fauna' ° and 20,000 species of flora" t
are presently recognized as threatened with extinction.' 2 Current
figures indicate that most of these species will be exterminated in the
near future unless effective restrictions are placed upon this ongoing
myopic trade. 13
In an effort to reverse this trend a multilateral treaty known as
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)'4 was adopted. CITES is designed to
protect species of animals and plants determined by the Convention
to be presently or foreseeably threatened by commercial movement.' 5
The treaty is based on the premise that by focusing efforts on control-
ling trade in endangered species, defensive State reactions to over-
exploitative trade will be reduced, and the free commercial move-
which have been reduced to less than 300. C. CADIEUX, THESE ARE THE ENDANGERED
(1981); D. STEWART, FROM THE EDGE OF EXTINCTION (1978).
8. Formal scientific data on species' population status is gathered by various governmen-
tal and independent research groups such as the USFW, TRAFFIC, Wildlife Trade Monitor-
ing Unit (WTMU), African Elephant and Rhino Group, and the Pet Industry Joint Advisory
Committee (PIJAC). The TRAFFIC Network is currently comprised of seven members lo-
cated in Japan, Australia, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and
the United States. 5 TRAFFIC, 1983 Newsletter No. 4, at 18. See supra note 1.
9. Approximately ten percent of all species of plants and animals are presently believed
to be threatened with extinction. S. EXEC. REP. No. 14, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973). In
particular, wild mammals and birds are being exterminated at an estimated rate of one species
per year. An arguably conservative figure for the present extinction rate of all species is ap-
proximately one species becoming extinct per day. N. MEYERS, THE SINKING ARK 31 (1979);
K. CURRY-LINDAHL, LET THEM LIVE vii (1972). "In the case of mammals alone, nearly 60
percent of recorded exterminations have occurred in the 20th Century in less than 4 percent of
the 2,000 years of record." 68 DEPT. ST. BULL 613 (1973) (statement of Mr. Train, Chairman
of U.S. Delegation). See also COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ELEVENTH ANNUAL
REPORT 23 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REPORT].
10. "Flora" is defined as "plant or plant life characteristic of, or peculiar to a region or
locality." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 874 (1967).
11. "Fauna" is defined as "animal or animal life characteristic of, or peculiar to a region
or locality." Id. at 829.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 42-74.
13. It is estimated that if present trends continue, by the year 2000 over one million spe-
cies may become extinct as a direct result of man's activities. This figure represents an average
of 100 species becoming extinct per day. MEYERS, supra note 9, at 31; Russakoff, Endangered
Species Act Stemming the Trend, Wash. Post, Jan. 1, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
14. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
July 1, 1975, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249 [hereinafter cited as CITES]. For the legisla-
tive history, see President of the United States, Message to the Senate Transmitting the Con-
vention on the International Trade of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, S. EXEC.
REP. No. 14, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); 68 DEPT. ST. BULL. 613 (1973). See also Comment,
Legislative Developments: Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, 6 LAW AND POL'Y BUS. 1211, 1216 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Legislative
Developments].
15. CITES, supra note 14, art. II.
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ment of plentiful wildlife will be enhanced. When CITES was first
drafted, 6 the primary task was to identify threatened species and
construct a workable system of guidelines to effectively protect
them. 7 For the most part this was successfully achieved by the Con-
vention's framework and organizational structure.18  However,
CITES has had only limited success in actually curbing over-ex-
ploitative trade in those species which have been identified as in need
of protection. This impotence can be traced to several problems that
limit the treaty's practical effectiveness: (1) inherent weaknesses re-
sulting from provisions that allow major trade exemptions, 9 and (2)
practical obstacles to effective enforcement. 20 Acutely aware of these
deficiencies, the central focus of the Parties today is on enforcing
CITES regulations and improving the overall implementation of the
treaty.2'
This Comment will explore the issues surrounding over-ex-
ploitative international wildlife trade and address the need for a co-
operative effort to resolve the conflicts which the practice has
created. Presently, the most significant international mechanism
designed to curb such trade is CITES; its structure and operation will
therefore be examined. An analysis of the Convention's strengths
and weaknesses will follow, focusing on exemptions from trade re-
strictions and the practical difficulties of effectively implementing and
enforcing specific provisions. The signatories' responses to these is-
sues will be evaluated in light of their effectiveness, and suggestions
will be offered in an effort to minimize operational problems and ex-
tend current successes.
I. THE NEED FOR A COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT
Increased environmental awareness and scientific sophistication
has resulted in the establishment of a strong case for wildlife preser-
vation. Public opinion continues to support the historically offered
contention that aesthetic, ethical and cultural arguments alone justify
efforts to protect the earth's wildlife.22 Scientists have demonstrated
that as a practical concern a strong relationship exists between the
16. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
17. Train, It's Time to Get Tough, 5 Focus, 1983 Newsletter No. 5, at 2. See 68 DEPT.
ST. BULL. 611. Mr. Train is currently President of the World Wildlife Fund.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 42-106.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 121-226.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 230-324.
21. Train, supra note 17, at 2.
22. MEYERS, supra note 9, at 41; EHRLICH, supra note 5, at 35-52.
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planet's ecological stability and a high diversity of species.23 Com-
mercial enterprises have also found that "the genetic resources of
species serve many pragmatic purposes of humankind. These pur-
poses bring immediate utilitarian benefits to society, through contri-
butions to modernized agriculture (for example, new foods), to
modernized medicine and pharmaceuticals (drugs from plants), and
industrial processes (raw materials)." 24 Considerations such as these
prompted several nations to enact legislation and adopt other meas-
ures to protect various species since the turn of this century.25
Initial efforts made little progress in controlling over-exploita-
tive international trade, as domestic measures were generally di-
rected only at internal problems.26 Most of the world's exporting
nations traditionally did little to regulate wildlife taken from their
territories." As a result, many species were removed from the wild
faster than they could reproduce, and large percentages of potentially
renewable wildlife resources were reduced to a fraction of their origi-
nal numbers.2 8 The economic yield that these "range States" derived
23. MEYERS, supra note 9 at 48-52; EHRLICH, supra note 5, at 32-80; ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY REPORT, supra note 9, at 32-80. For example, "the Interior Department estimates
that the extinction of one plant can lead to the disappearance of 30 other species, including
insects and higher animals." Grier, U.S. Marks Decade of Special Care for its Endangered
Wildlife, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 31, 1984, at 28, col. 3.
24. MEYERS, supra note 9, at 56; see also EHRLICH, supra note 5, at 53-76; ENVIRONMEN-
TAL QUALITY REPORT, supra note 9, at 32-80.
25. Congress has passed several acts protecting various species since the turn of the cen-
tury. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (repealed
1973); Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 88-578, 78 Stat. 897
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 460-464 to 460-411 (1976 and Supp. III 1979)); Black
Bass Act of 1926, ch. 346, 44 Stat. 576 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 851-856 (1976));
Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 703-711 (1976)); Lacey Act of 1900, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (partially codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 667e, 701 (1976)).
Decisive action has also been taken by non-governmental groups. Notably, in 1966 United
States zoo officials placed an embargo on the import of orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus abelli, P.
pygmaeus) that was joined by the United Kingdom, Japan and West Germany. See Oberle,
Endangered Species: Congress Curbs International Trade in Rare Animals, 197 Sci., Jan. 9,
1970, at 153.
26. See, e.g., supra notes 6 & 25. But see R. BOARDMAN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TION AND THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE 26-34 (1981).
27. This was particularly true of developing countries. See INSKIPP & WELLS, supra note
5, at 27-77.
28. For example, the Northern white rhino is native to Kenya. In 1973, the Northern
white rhino population was estimated at only 20,000. Today their numbers have been further
reduced and hover alarmingly near 1,000. Of the other five species of rhinoceri, there are now
thought to exist approximately 10,000-20,000 black rhinos; 3,000 Southern white rhinos; 2,000
Indian rhinos, 200 Sumarian rhinos; and fewer than 60 Javan rhinos. African Elephant and
Rhino Group, 1983 Newsletter No. 1, at 5-11. See also Webster, Foul Humored Rhinos Going
to Texas Haven, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
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from the export of native wildlife dwindled as desired species became
increasingly less obtainable.29 Eventually, many of the nations which
depended upon wildlife trade were forced to re-evaluate their conser-
vation policies and concluded that concerted action was necessary to
correct what had become an economically self-defeating situation.30
Facing the impending permanent loss of vital national assets, these
nations began to appreciate that effective conservation and trade reg-
ulation were necessary to insure that native wildlife would remain a
renewable resource. 3' Gradually, the practice of benign neglect was
replaced with the understanding that wildlife "can and should be
used correctly, for the benefit of the resource, and the people on
whose land it occurs.
' 32
The growing economic impetus to regulate trade brought many
range States whose wildlife resources had seriously dwindled to a
common ground with many developed nations which had already at-
tempted to limit wildlife trade for what are generally referred to as
29. As species become rare, they often become increasingly valuable due to intensified
demand. Although the volume of trade in such species is reduced, dealers benefit economically
as they are able to obtain proportionately higher prices for rare species. See supra note 1.
Conversely, States which rely on wildlife exports for substantial percentages of their national
revenue depend on high volume trade. These countries are disadvantaged by depletions of
wildlife populations despite the higher profits increasingly rare specimens bring to individual
dealers.
30. This is particularly true for developing countries, especially those with an indigenous
population of crocodiles, e.g., Paraguay, Columbia, Bolivia and Argentina; elephants, e.g., Bot-
swana, Zambia and the Republic of South Africa; parrots, e.g., Brazil; rhinoceri, e.g., Kenya;
leopards, e.g., Congo, Zaire, Uganda and Kenya; and sea turtles, e.g., Mexico and the Caiman
Islands. See generally INSKIPP & WELLS, supra note 5.
31. To illustrate, Thailand enacted protective wildlife legislation in 1960. Brazil entirely
banned export of all wildlife products in 1967. Venezuela banned the export of crocodile hides
in 1970. INSKIPP & WELLS, supra note 5, at 5.
32. Proceedings of the Fourth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Gaborone, Bot-
swana, Conf. 4.14 (Apr. 19-30, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Botswana Proceedings]. Effective
wildlife management requires trade regulations that guarantee stable population levels main-
tained at numbers that do not threaten the species' survival chances. If this balance is achieved
certain percentages of native wildlife can be regularly "harvested" or "culled" to provide con-
tinued income for their range States. See IUCN, WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY: LIVING
RESOURCE CONSERVATION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1980). However, if trade is
not regulated and becomes over-exploitative, nations are often forced to choose between contin-
uing trade and risking the loss of the species, or prohibiting or severely limiting trade in order
to allow the depleted population to attempt to replenish itself. If the restrictions come too late,
however, the species may not be able to recover despite even total trade bans. For example, in
1941 the entire Whooping crane population was reduced to twenty-one birds. Although both
the United States and Canada acted to totally protect the species' entire migratory and nesting
areas, the population has risen to only 150 birds in almost twenty-five years of concerted con-
servation effort. See J. FISHER, N. SIMON & J. VINCENT, WILDLIFE IN DANGER 223-225
(1969). The California condor (Gymnogyps californianus) provides another illlustrative exam-
ple of a situation in which this has occured. See CADIEUX, supra note 7, at 25-29.
Vol. 15
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humanitarian reasons.33 By the late 1960's the international commu-
nity began to coalese into an integration of two distinct blocs that
were unified by their common desire to control wildlife trade,
although distinguished by differing motives.34 The International
Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
(IUCN),3 5 under the direction of the United Nations Environmental
Program (UNEP), circulated three drafts through the United Na-
tions between 1967 and 1971.36 Both the economic and conservation
oriented nations recognized the necessity of international coopera-
tion,3 7 and by the early 1970's this understanding set the stage for the
establishment of a legal mechanism that would promote "the mainte-
nance of those species throughout their ranges at levels consistent
with their roles in the ecosystems in which they occur."38 In the
33. See supra text accompanying note 22.
34. This categorization is not a formal designation, but rather is used here to help illus-
trate the historical background of international cooperation in the area of wildlife trade. See
BOARDMAN, supra note 26, at 86-96 (1981).
35. The IUCN is "an independent international organization whose membership com-
prises States (irrespective of their political and social systems), governmental departments, pri-
vate societies and institutions, and international organizations." Although it is not a United
Nations Organization, it is supported by UN agencies "such as the Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization (F.A.O.), the Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the
Economic and Social Council (ESOSOC), and that of the Council of Europe and other inter-
governmental bodies. With all of these it has full consultative status." FISHER, SIMON & VIN-
CENT, supra note 32, at 9.
The ICUN originally began on private initiative in Brussels in 1934 as l'office International
pour la Protection de la Nature (O.I.P.N.). After an international conference sponsored by
UNESCO and the Government of France, the O.I.P.N. evolved into the International Union
for the Protection of Nature (IUPN) in 1948. After attracting widening support, the IUPN
was redesignated the IUCN in 1956. Id. See generally BOARDMAN, supra note 26, at 26-123.
36. "The move towards an international convention to conserve species threatened with
trade was launched at the 8th General Assembly of [the] IUCN in Nairobi in 1963. Formal
drafts . . . were sent to governments . . . in September 1967, August 1969, and March 1971
. .. The governments of the United States and Kenya also prepared and circulated drafts.
In June 1972, the UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm "recom-
mended (Recommendation 99.3 of the Action Plan) that a plenipotentiary conference be held
...to prepare and adopt a convention on export, import and transit of certain species of wild
animals and plants." IUCN Memorandum Concerning the Working Paper for the Endan-
gered Species Conference, Nov. 10, 1972, Doc. 4, annex 1 (unofficial copy on file at California
Western International Law Journal). "The United States, aware of its ... responsibilities as
host Government. . .and recognizing that the Conference would be severly impeded should it
be faced with three competing drafts, sent an informal mission to the IUCN and to Nairobi
which achieved the Unified Working Paper subsequently used by the Conference." 68 DEPT.
ST. BULL. 615.
37. Many nations had enacted domestic legislation to protect endangered wildlife within
their own territories. See, e.g., supra notes 6 & 31. Legislation of this nature, however, was
insufficient to control a problem of international dimensions. See generally BOARDMAN, supra
note 26, at 25-124.
38. Botswana Proceeding, supra note 32, Conf. 4.14.
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attempt to further two independent but arguably parallel goals
through a single cooperative effort,39 a multilateral treaty was signed
in March 1973.' This treaty entered into force in July 1975 and was
originally ratified by thirty-two countries. Currently eighty-seven na-
tions are signatories to CITES, the most widely accepted interna-
tional conservation consensus ever developed.4
II. THE CONVENTION'S STRUCTURE: AN INTERNATIONAL
ATTEMPT TO REGULATE WILDLIFE TRADE
CITES utilizes a comprehensive system of regulations designed
to insure that endangered wildlife is not over-exploited by trade, and
that non-endangered wildlife flows freely in international commerce.
A discussion of the Convention's overall structure and operational
mechanism is essential in understanding this system.
A. CITES Permits and Appendices
CITES incorporates a system. of import and export permits
42
which serves as the basic control mechanism in regulating the inter-
national trade43 of those species" threatened with extinction. These
permits are analogous to passports;4 5 they must be presented at cus-
toms before shipments of endangered flora or fauna will be granted
entrance to or exit from a Party State.4 6
39. See CITES, supra note 14, preamble.
40. CITES was originally signed in Washington D.C., and is often refered to around the
world as the "Washington Convention."
41. Compare CITES with Convention on the Conservation of Antartic Marine Living Re-
sources, May 20, 1982, T.I.A.S. No. 10240 (10 parties); Agreement on the Conservation of
Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973, T.I.A.S. No. 8409 (5 parties); Convention for the Conservation of
Antartic Seals, June 1, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 443, T.I.A.S. No. 8826 (11 parties); Interim Convention
on Conservation of Northern Pacific Fur Seals, Feb. 9, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 2285, T.I.A.S. No. 3948,
324 U.N.T.S. 105 (4 parties); International Plant Protection Convention, Dec. 6, 1951, 23
U.S.T. 2769, T.I.A.S. No. 7465, 150 U.N.T.S. 67 (entered into force for the U.S. in 1972) (82
parties); International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 10 U.S.T. 952,
T.I.A.S. No. 4228, 338 U.N.T.S. 366 (last amendment July 26, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 9946) (34
parties); Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemi-
sphere, Oct, 12, 1940, 56 STAT. 1354, 194 U.N.T.S. 485 (17 parties). See generally BOARD-
MAN, supra note 26, at 25-124.
42. CITES, supra note 14, arts. III (2-4), IV(2).
43. The Convention defines "trade" as the "export, import or introduction from the sea."
Id. art. I (c).
44. The Convention defines "species" as "any species, sub-species or geographically sepa-
rate population thereof." Id. art. I(a).
45. Grove, Wild Cargo. The Business of Smuggling Animals, 159 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC
287, 294 (1981).
46. To facilitate processing specimens, the Convention provides that parties may designate
Vol. 15
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CITES lists those species that have been determined to require
trade protection in one of three appendices.47 The appendices indi-
cate two important factors: (1) the permits required before a species
can be legally traded, and (2) the requirements that must be met
before a permit may issue.48 Placing a species in one of the appendi-
ces therefore determines not only the conditions that must be satis-
fied before it can be traded, but also the degree of trade protection
that the species will receive.
The appendices classify wildlife recognized as in need of protec-
tion into three different groups: (1) "presently" endangered (Appen-
dix I), (2) "potentially" endangered (Appendix II), and (3) "locally"
endangered (Appendix III)."9 An appreciation of the operation of
CITES is best attained by examining its classification scheme.
Appendix I includes "all species threatened with extinction
which are, or may be affected by trade."5° Since their extinction is
imminent, trade in Appendix I specimens" is subject to the strictest
regulations imposed by CITES.5 2 Examples of Appendix I species
include the Humpback whale, Northern white rhinocerous, Moun-
tain gorilla and Living rock cactus.5 3  Trade in Appendix I speci-
mens is limited to situations in which both the exporting and
importing countries issue the requisite permits. A trader is required
to present both an import and export permit at the customs office of
the exporting country at the time of export, 54 and at the customs
ports of entry and exit at which shipments must be presented for clearance. CITES, supra note
14, art. VIII(e). By limiting its wildlife trade access points a party can concentrate its law
enforcement forces in specific areas, thus making the most efficient use of generally limited
funds. There are currently nine desinated points in the United States: Los Angeles, CA; San
Francisco, CA; Honolulu, HI; Seattle, WA; Dallas, TX; New Orleans, LA; Miami, FL; Chi-
cago, IL and New York, NY.
47. Id. art. 11(1-3).
48. Id. arts. 111(2-5), IV (2-7).
49. Id. art. II. The distinction between Appendix I and II species roughly corresponds to
the United States distinction between those species that are "endangered" and those that are
"threatened." Compare CITES with Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1973 &
Supp. III 1979).
50. CITES, supra note 14, art. II(1).
51. The language of the treaty regarding "specimens" has caused confusion and enforce-
ment problems. For a detailed discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 189-226.
52. CITES, supra note 14, art. 111(2-5).
53. Over fifty species of cacti are listed in Appendix I. For an excellent discussion of the
issues surrounding United States conservation of flora, see McMahan, What Is Protection?,
THE TENNESSEE CONSERVATIONIST, Mar./Apr. 1984, at 5-7; Comment, Legal Protection for
Rare Plants, 29 AM. U. L. REV. 515 (1980).
54. CITES, supra note 14, art. III (2).
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office of the importing country at the time of import." This double
checking procedure is employed to insure prevention of over-ex-
ploitative trade in presently endangered species.
The conditions that must be met under CITES before a species
can be legally traded differ as to the importing and exporting nation.
An importing nation must be satisfied that three conditions have
been met before it can issue an import permit for an Appendix I spec-
imen. First and most importantly, the importing State must be satis-
fied that the specimen will not be used for primarily commercial
purposes.5 6 Although CITES thereby limits trade of the most highly
endangered species to bona fide scientific or cultural endeavors such
as zoos, museums or biomedical research firms, these institutions
may also pose potentially significant threats to endangered popula-
tions.5 7 CITES therefore requires that the importing State must also
determine that the proposed importation is not detrimental to the
survival of the species' population in its native habitat, regardless of
the specimen's eventual destination. 58  This condition ensures that
highly threatened species cannot be traded for even non-commercial
55. Id. art. III (3).
56. Id. art. III (4).
57. In 1977 the United States Department of Justice cracked a major wildlife smuggling
ring in which nine of the nation's major zoos were implicated as buyers of illegally traded
endangered reptiles. Proceedings of the Third Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, New
Delhi, India, Doc. 3.34 (Feb. 25-Mar. 8, 1981) [hereinafter cited as New Delhi Proceedings].
See also Holden, Cracking Down on Illegal Wildlife Trade, 206 Sci., Nov. 16, 1979, at 801.
Zoos also put indirect pressure on endangered species. For example, prior to 1966 the
wild orangutan population was seriously threatened as a result of demand by foreign zoos.
Oberle, supra note 25, at 153. Another contributing factor is that the mortality rate of speci-
mens held and shipped is inordinate, especially since zoos often obtain specimens from unscru-
pulous wildlife dealers. For example, in 1978 forty gibbons, three tapirs, three leopards and
fifty macaques arrived at the Bangkok airport in a total of six cages. They were held at the
airport for several days in extreme heat while awaiting shipment to Belgium before they finally
died. Such incidents are especially significant in the case of threatened species. For example,
the death of the forty gibbons actually represented the destruction of a least one hundred breed-
ing groups. ERLICH, supra note 5, at 119-21.
Additionally, the high demand for primates for medical and scientific research has been
largely responsible for pushing certain species towards extinction. This has been most noticea-
ble in the cases of the gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) and chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes), both highly
endangered species listed in Appendix I. Large numbers of these animals are often killed in the
difficult and dangerous process of capture. A common method of capturing chimpanzees, for
example, is to slaughter the adults in order to take the younger animals. Several chimpanzees
may be killed in this process so that one may be traded abroad. As with all great apes, gorillas
and chimpanzees have a very low breeding potential, and their wild populations have been
seriously threatened by such practices. Moreover, the quality of some research is often ques-
tionable, and animals that survive capture are often sacrificed for use in dubious projects. IN-
SKIPP & WELLS, supra note 5, at 31; EHRLICH, supra note 5, at 119-21.
58. CITES, supra note 14, art. III (3)(a).
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purposes if that trade is damaging to the species' survival in the wild.
Finally, CITES requires that the importing State must be satisfied
that the proposed recipient is suitably equipped to house and care for
the imported specimen.59 Only if the above three criteria are satisfied
may the importing State issue the necessary import permit.
CITES also places stringent restrictions upon those countries ex-
porting Appendix I specimens. Before an exporting State can export
an Appendix I specimen that State must first verify that a valid im-
port permit has been issued by the importing State.6 The exporting
State must also determine that: (1) the specimen's export is not detri-
mental to the survival of the species;6 ' (2) the specimen was not ob-
tained in contravention of its own wildlife protection laws;62 and (3)
living specimens are prepared and transported so as to minimize the
risk of injury, damage to health and cruel treatment.63
Appendix II includes all species which, although not presently
threatened with extinction, may become so unless their trade is
strictly regulated.' These species are not considered to be as seri-
ously threatened as those listed in Appendix I. Examples of Appen-
dix II species include the Pygmy hippopotamus, American grizzly
bear65 and most species of dolphins and porpoises.66 The most signif-
59. Id. art. III (3)(b).
60. Id. art. III (2)(d).
61. Id. art. III (2)(a).
62. Id. art. III (2)(b).
63. Id. art. III (2)(c).
64. Appendix II shall include:
(a) all species which although not necessarily now threatened with extinction may
become so unless trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict regulation
in order to avoid utilization incompatible with their survival; and
(b) other species which must be subject to regulation in order that trade in speci-
mens of certain species referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph may be
brought under effective control.
Id. art. II (2)(a)(b).
65. For an interesting account of the role a threatened species such as the Grizzly bear
may play in the effort to preserve wilderness habitats under the National Environmental Policy
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4335, see Comment, Montana Grizzly Bears Protest Exploratory Drill-
ing in Wilderness Area, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 467 (1983).
66. The legal issues surrounding various aspects of marine mammal conservation have
received a modest amount of critical attention. See, e.g., Comment, International Aspects of the
Tuna-Porpoise Association Phenomenon: How Much Protection For Poseidon's Sacred Messen-
gers?, 7 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 639 (1977); Travalio & Clement, International Protection for
Marine Mammals, 5 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 199 (1979); Nafziger, Global Conservation and
Management of Marine Mammals, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 591 (1980); M'Gonigle, The "Econ-
omizing" of Ecology: Why Big, Rare Whales Still Die, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 119 (1980); Bonker,
U.S. Policy and Strategy in the International Whaling Commission: Sinking or Swimming?, 10
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 41 (1980); Carlson, The International Regulation of Small Cetaceans,
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 577 (1984).
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icant distinction between the two appendices is that Appendix II
specimens may be traded for commercial purposes.67 Since commer-
cial trade is often a major threat to wildlife populations, Appendix II
species are afforded considerably less protection than that provided
for Appendix I species. Moreover, trade in Appendix II specimens is
not as highly regulated as trade in Appendix I specimens. Unlike
Appendix I requirements, traders desiring to ship an Appendix II
specimen must present only a valid export permit;68 the issuance of
an import permit by the State of importation is not required. Thus,
protection of Appendix II species is the sole responsibility of the ex-
porting country. 69 The criteria for issuing an export permit for an
Appendix II species are much the same as those for an Appendix I
export permit.7" These include determining that the specimen's ex-
port is not detrimental to the survival of the species and that it was
not obtained in contravention of the State's wildlife protection
laws.7
Appendix III includes all species that are not considered endan-
gered internationally, but have been identified by an individual party
as subject to regulation within its own jurisdiction.72 CITES sup-
ports a party's request for cooperation on the part of other parties in
controlling trade of the species so listed. Similar to Appendix II
specimens, traders in Appendix III specimens must present only a
valid export permit73 when importing and exporting such a speci-
men.74 Thus, Appendix III specimens receive the same protection as
Appendix II specimens and are subject to the same regulation.
B. CITES Enforcement Provisions
CITES is not a self-executing treaty and the responsibility for
enforcing its provisions is relegated to each Party State.75 CITES
directs parties to take appropriate enforcement measures which in-
67. Compare CITES, supra note 14, art. 111(2-3) with art. III (2).
68. Id. art. IV (2).
69. Id. art. IV (2-4).
70. Id. art. IV (2)(a-c).
71. Id.
72. Id. art. 11 (3).
73. Appendix III specimens may also be imported upon presentation of a certificate of
origin, if the export is from a party not listing the species on Appendix III. Id. art. V (3).
74. Id. art. V (2-4).
75. Id. art. VIII (1). Self-executing treaties are enforceable by virtue of the agreement
itself, whereas non self-executing treaties are dependent upon enabling legislation of parties for
their enforcement. See Schneebaum, The Enforceability of Customary Norms of Public Interna-
tional Law, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 289 (1982).
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clude penalizing trade in or possession of species traded in violation
of the Convention.76 In addition, parties are to confiscate and return
such specimens to the State of export.77 The domestic wildlife laws
of each party vary greatly in content, scope and effectiveness.
78
Consequently, CITES is implemented differently by each party ac-
cording to it's own enabling wildlife legislation. 79 Although the par-
ties are unified in purpose, they are essentially on their own in
implementing the treaty designed to further their common goal.
C. National Management and Scientific Authorities
Each party to CITES must designate national authorities to ad-
minister the permit control system and make the mandated scientific
determinations discussed above."0 National authorities work in co-
operation with one another to implement the Convention's provi-
sions."1 Each signatory's national authority must have both a
scientific and management division.82 The scientific authority makes
the biological and ecological determinations required by CITES. 3
The most important of these determinations is deciding whether a
species is sufficiently threatened to warrant protecting it under the
Convention.84 If this finding is positive the scientific authority also
76. CITES, supra note 14, art. VIII (1).
77. Id. art. VIII (4)(a). Confiscated live specimens are to be entrusted to the management
authority of the State of confiscation. Id. The Convention also provides that the management
authority shall return, after consultation with the State of export, live specimens to that State at
the expense of the exporting State. Id. art. VIII (4)(b).
78. For a discussion of Canadian wildlife conservation legislation, see Versteeg, The Pro-
tection of Endangered Species: A Canadian Perspective, 11 ECOLOGY L. Q. 267, 284 (1984); for
New Zealand's efforts in this area see Wells, Protection of Wildlife in the Environment, 4 AUCK-
LAND U.L. R. 382 (1983).
79. For example, CITES is implemented in the United States by the Engangered Species
Act (ESA). Additionally, one of the major problems in enforcing other countries' wildlife laws
is that often one Party State does not know the laws of another Party State. For a detailed
discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 280-98.
80. CITES, supra note 14, art. IX (1).
81. Originally, the United States Scientific and Management Authorities were independ-
ent bodies, working together as required by Article IX (1) of CITES. The two branches were
eventually combined (for primarily budgetary considerations), and transferred to the auspices
of USFW by the 1979 amendment to the ESA. The Federal Wildlife and Permit Office (WPO)
acts as the United States Management Authority, and the Division of Law Enforcement imple-
ments its directives. Additionally, the United States has seven regional offices working under
the authority of USFW. Telephone interview with Bill Brown of the Environmental Defense
Fund (Sept. 23, 1983). Mr. Brown was the first director of the United States Scientific Author-
ity, from 1977-78.
82. CITES, supra note 14, art. IX(l).
83. Id. art. IX (1)(b).
84. Id. arts. III(2)(a), (3)(a)(b); IV (2)(a)(3).
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determines the extent to which a species is threatened, and lists it
accordingly in the proper appendix. Additionally, the scientific au-
thority monitors the species' ongoing survival status and changes its
appendix listing when appropriate.8 5
These scientific data are then relayed to the management au-
thority, which carries out the mechanical implementation of CITES
for the party.8 6 The responsibilities of the management authority in-
clude granting permits on behalf of the party and carrying out the
law enforcement aspects of the treaty. The management authority
may not approve trade of a listed species by issuing the requisite per-
mits unless the scientific authority has first made the necessary spe-
cific findings that the trade is authorized under CITES."7 Ideally, the
management authority will strictly regulate trade of species deter-
mined by the scientific authority to be in danger of extinction to in-
sure their continued renewability. 8
D. CITES Secretariat
The responsibility of coordinating the party's national authori-
ties is delegated to the Convention's Secretariat. 9 This "small inter-
national secretariat . . . merely functions as a 'switchboard' to
facilitate direct contacts between the countries concerned."9 The
Secretariat is a part of the ICUN, which administers the program on
behalf of the Executive Director of UNEP.91 Parties are required to
keep detailed records of trade in species regulated by CITES and to
forward these records annually to the Secretariat.92 The Secretariat
also receives biennial reports on each party's legislative, regulatory
85. Id. art. XV, XVI. The parties have established formal scientific standards for deter-
mining the appropriateness of adding, deleting and transferring species and other taxa to and
from the various appendices. These standards are known as the "Berne Criteria." Proceedings
of the First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Berne, Switzerland, Conf. 1.1, 1.2, 1.3
(November 2-6, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Berne Proceedings].
86. CITES, supra note 14, art. IX (1)(a).
87. Id. arts. III (2)(a), (3)(a-b), (5)(a); IV (2)(a), (3), (5)(b), (6)(a).
88. For problems created by this bureaucratic network, see infra text accompanying notes
252-79.
89. CITES, supra note 14, art. XII (1).
90. Sand, supra note 1, at 56. Mr. Sand is a past Secretary General of the Convention's
Secretariat. The offices of the Convention's Secretariat are located in Gland, Switzerland, and
consist of the Secretary General, two scientists, two secretaries and a lawyer. The Secretariat is
currently funded by UNEP and the IUCN. The future funding of the Secretariat and the
Conference of the Parties is uncertain at this time. See, e.g., Botswana Proceedings, supra note
32, Conf. 4.3.
91. See supra notes 35-36.
92. CITES, supra note 14, art. VIII (6).
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and administrative measures taken to enforce the provisions of the
Convention.93
E. Conferences of the Parties and Amendment Procedures
CITES also provides for biennial conferences of the parties.94
Conferences serve primarily as a mechanism for modifying the ap-
pendices and improving the effectiveness of the Convention through
party recommendations and resolutions.9" Resolutions and recom-
mendations are "criteria or standards" used to guide parties and the
Secretariat in administrative and procedural implementation of the
treaty, and are informal vehicles of modifying the treaty that may be
adopted by consensus or majority vote.9 6 Conference resolutions
represent the articulated culmination of the parties' ongoing experi-
ence in their attempt to effectuate the treaty's purposes. Despite
their extreme importance, however, conference resolutions are non-
binding,97 which concededly weakens their effectiveness. Resolutions
represent at most an indication of a willingness on behalf of the par-
ties to exert a bona fide effort to achieve the objectives addressed
therein.98
The drafters of the Convention recognized that trade patterns
and wildlife populations change over time, and that in order to re-
main effective CITES would have to contain an apparatus that ena-
93. Id. art. VIII (7)(b). See infra text accompanying notes 278-79.
94. Id. art. XI. The Conference provides for a regular meeting of the parties at least once
every two years. To date the parties have met in Berne, Switzeland (1976); San Jose, Costa
Rica (1979); New Delhi, India (1981); and Garborone, Botswana (1983). The Fifth Meeting of
the Conference of the Parties will be held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, Apr. 22-May 3, 1985.
95. The Convention also provides for participation by observers representing the United
Nations and its specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and non-party
nations. CITES, supra note 14, art. XI (6). Additionally, government or non-government in-
ternational agencies, national government agencies, and locally approved non-government
agencies may be admitted and allowed to participate unless one-third of the parties present
object. Id. art. XI (7). However, only parties to the Convention may actually vote. Neverthe-
less, effective observer status has been employed by both private conservation groups and eco-
nomic lobby groups "ranging from luxury fur and leather industries (for wildlife products) to
pet dealers, safari parks and biomedical research establishments (for live animals)." Sand,
supra note 1, at 58.
96. Comment, Enforcement Problems in the Endangered Species Convention: Reservations
Regarding the Reservation Clause, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 429, 434 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Reservations Regarding the Reservation Clause]. See also Proceedings of the Second Meeting of
the Conference of the Parties, Doc. 2.36 (San Jose, Costa Rica, Mar. 19-30, 1970) [hereinafter
cited as San Jose Proceedings].
97. Interview with Bill Brown, supra note 81.
98. See infra text accompanying notes 337-41.
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bled the signatories to adapt to such fluctuations.99 To furnish this
flexibility the Convention provides procedures for amending both the
appendices" and the text of the treaty. °1 Appendix amendments
allow the Conference to add, delete and shift species from one appen-
dix to another, thereby adopting or relaxing protection for species
considered either newly endangered or no longer threatened.'° 2 Ap-
pendices can be amended at biennial conferences, or between confer-
ences via parties' submission of proposals to the Secretariat.' 0 3  The
signatories may also amend the treaty's text, but to do so the Secreta-
riat must convene an extraordinary meeting of the parties."w This
procedure is rarely invoked"0 5 and is only mandated upon written
request to the Secretariat by at least one-third of the treaty's
signatories. 1
0 6
99. Species may become endangered as a result of habitat destruction, abusive trade,
heavy use as a food source or adverse climate conditions. The destruction of entire ecosys-
tems, however, is considered to be the single greatest threat to wildlife populations. Currently,
there is no international agreement designed to combat this problem. CITES is designed to
deal only with abusive trade, and as such, it offers no protection to wildlife from habitat de-
struction. EHRLICH, supra note 5, at 129-176; COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT 197-204 (1981); IUCN, supra note 32.
It has been demonstrated that effective conservation may be efficently implemented
through direct habitat protection. For example, the Bengal tiger (Panthera tigris) population
had been reduced from 40,000 at the turn of the century to only 1,827 by 1972. In 1973 India
began "Project Tiger," a measure that created eleven tiger reserves throughout the country. In
ten years the population climbed to 3015 animals, an increase of 85 percent. WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Aug. 6, 1982, at 1, col. 4.
100. CITES, supra note 14, art. XV, XVI. For detailed analysis of this procedure, see
Legislative Developments, supra note 14, at 1224-25.
101. CITES, supra note 14, art. XVII.
102. Id. At the Botswana Proceedings the Conference made numerous amendments to the
appendices. For example, the ostrich (order Struthioniformes), Agave cactus (Leuchtenbergia
principis), Mona boa (Epicrates monensis) and Bottle-nosed whale (Hyperoodon spp.) were ad-
ded to Appendix I. The European brown bear (Ursus arctos) and the Nile crocodile (Crocody-
lus niloticus) were shifted from Appendix I to Appendix II, and the Giant clam (Tridacna deras
and Tridacna gigas) was newly added to Appendix II. Conversely, the Swift fox (Vulpes velox
hebes) and Lake sturgeon (Acipenser fulvescens) were removed from CITES appendices en-
tirely. 48 Fed. Reg. 45, 259 (1983)(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 23).
103. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
104. CITES, supra note 14, art. XVII, XI (2).
105. The First Extraordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties was held in Bonn,
Federal Republic of Germany, on June 22, 1979, to consider adoption of a financial amend-
ment to CITES. Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Fourth Meeting of the Conference of the
Parties (1983) (unofficial copy on file at California Western International Law Journal). The
Second Extraordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties was held in Gaborone, Bot-
swana, on April 30, 1983, to consider an amendment to CITES that would enable regional
Economic Integration Organizations such as the European Economic Community (EEC) to
accede to CITES. Botswana proceedings, supra note 32, Doc. E.2.3. For a discussion of the
EEC's adoption of CITES see infra note 126.
106. CITES, supra note 14, art. XVII(l).
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CITES is a highly practical mechanism incorporating a struc-
ture designed to deal with a complex international situation. The
Convention has taken considerable steps in slowing the trend toward
extinction'1 7 and represents a potential tour de force of international
wildlife cooperation. Several problems, however, have continuously
obstructed implementation of the Convention, directly minimizing its
overall effectiveness thus far.
III. RECURRING PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION
Despite its foundational soundness CITES has enjoyed only lim-
ited practical success. 0 g Some commentators believe that the treaty
has done more to promote rather than prevent over-exploitative
trade. Some United States wildlife managers, for example, have con-
tended that the need to cooperate with the Convention has been ex-
aggerated, and that the treaty has taken unjustifiable precedence over
domestic wildlife concerns. 10 9 Arguments have been advanced that
CITES has over-zealously listed species that are not endangered,
much to the detriment of foreign trade and international relations.°"0
Representatives of the pet trade and fur industries, tourists and
hunters have in good faith criticized the manner in which the treaty
has been implemented."'
107. See, e.g., 5 TRAFFIC, 1984 Newsletter No. 4, at 8-10 (U.S. import analysis for 1982,
data based on U.S. Imports for Consumption (IM-146), compiled by Bureau of the Census,
U.S. Dept. of Commerce); 5 TRAFFIC, 1984 Newsletter No. 3, at 3-11 (comparison of CITES
and non-CITES imports for 1982, data based on analysis of USFW 3-177 declaration data
supplied under a Freedom of Information Act request); 2 TRAFFIC, 1980 Newsletter No. 3 &
4, at 4-5 (U.S. import analysis for 1978-79, data based on a U.S. Imports for Consumption,
Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce).
108. Address by David Mack, Assistant Director of TRAFFIC (U.S.A.), presented at 1983
American Association of Zoological Parks and Aquariums Conference, Vancouver, Canada
(Sept. 20, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Mack Address] (copy on file at California Western Inter-
national Law Journal); Kaufman, Preserving Rare Species is an Ironic Success, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 8, 1981, at E20, col. I.
109. CADIEUX, supra note 7, at 172. One United States wildlife manager recently stated
that "[diuring a career spent in wildlife work, I often noticed that when the Department of the
Interior and the State Department butted heads in Washington, decisions were automatically
awarded to the State Department without hearings. This happened more often than coinci-
dence would allow." Id. at 170-171.
110. For example, the arguably unnecessary listing of the American alligator in the mid-
1970's severely damaged France's reptile hide industry. Similarly, the controversial listing of
the order Felidae has limited previously heavy United States trade in bobcat skins to Europe.
Id. at 171. For an interesting discussion of the litigation that ensued as a result of the listing of
the American bobcat see Note, Defenders of Wildlife, Inc. v. Endangered Species Scientific
Authority: The Court as Biologist, 12 ENVTL L. 773 (1982).
111. Interviews with Richard Parsons, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 22, 1983; Jan. 3, 5 and 6,
1984). Mr. Parsons was an original negotiator, drafter and administrator of CITES. He was
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Although the line drawn is often blurred, criticisms of this na-
ture sometimes reflect a dissatisfaction with the manner in which
CITES affects a particular interest group, as opposed to dissatisfac-
tion with its overall effectiveness in protecting endangered species
and legitimate wildlife trade." 2 The vast majority of administrators,
participants and commentators believe that CITES has made major
inroads in curbing over-exploitative trade."' Still, there is an almost
unanimous consensus even among these advocates that the treaty has
not been implemented on a level effective enough to make a substan-
tial difference in the majority of traded species." 4 Significant num-
bers and varieties of endangered wildlife continue to be traded,'
15
and legitimate trade in non-endangered species is often hindered in
the process.'16
The treaty's practical effectiveness has been limited by two ma-
jor problem areas. First, CITES suffers from inherent weaknesses
resulting from provisions that allow major trade exemptions. The
major" '7 weaknesses are language that eliminates protection for spe-
cies that are not "readily recognizable,""'  and exemptions for spe-
cies that are either "tourist souvenirs""' 9 or traded with nations not
signatories to the Convention. 20 Second, effective enforcement of
chief of the effective U.S. Management Authority (the Federal Wildlife Permit Office) from its
inception in 1976 until 1983.
112. See, e.g., supra note 110.
113. Interview with Michael Bean, Chairman of the Wildlife Program of the Environmen-
tal Defense Fund, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 4, 1984).
114. Interviews with Richard Parsons, supra note 111; Michael Bean, supra note 113;
Linda McMahan, supra note 1.
115. Based on 1982 records of the U.S. Bureau of the Census (U.S. Customs), the U.S. 1982
CITES Annual Report, and two requests submitted to USFW by TRAFFIC (U.S.A.) and the
National Audubon Society under the Freedom of Information Act, TRAFFIC analysis reveals
that "at the very minimum, one million skins and products of apparently illegal origin entered
the U.S. in 1982 alone. This figure does not include live animals or other wildlife categories
declared in measures of length or by weight." 5 TRAFFIC, 1984 Newsletter No. 3, at 12.
116. It has been suggested that CITES often places an undue and inequitable burden on
businesses and consumers. See Meyers & Parsons, A Look at Wildlife Trade-From Both
Sides, 5 TRAFFIC, 1984 Newsletter No. 5, at 3.
117. CITES actually contains several provisions that weaken the Convention's effective-
ness. Article VII contains seven specific exemptions, including provisions relating to specimens
either in transit, acquired before the Convention applied, bred in captivity, forming part of
travelling zoos or circuses or donated for noncommercial purposes. Additionally, Article XX-
III allows parties to enter specific reservations on certain species. See infra text accompanying
notes 137-59. For a detailed discussion of the issues attending the treaty's reservation clause,
see Reservations Regarding the Reservation Clause, supra note 96.
118. CITES, supra note 14, art. I(2)(b).
119. Id. art. VII (3).
120. Id art. X.
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CITES has been plagued by recurring practical obstacles, notably a
lack of efficient communication and adequate deterrence to violations
of the Convention.
A. Inherent Weaknesses-Exemptions from Trade Restrictions
The original drafts of CITES circulated by the IUCN contained
no provisions for tourist souvenir exemptions or trade with nonpar-
ties.12' Similarly, the drafts provided that the trade controls embod-
ied therein would apply to all listed "specimens." There was no
qualification applied to this language. The inclusion of these exemp-
tions and modifiers has significantly weakened the treaty, and it is
useful to examine the basis upon which they were originally accepted
and the functions they have ultimately served in order to ascertain
whether ample justification exists for retaining them today.
Careful analysis suggests that the original rationales for includ-
ing trade exemptions, viable in 1973, are now of questionable valid-
ity. The major factors that originally persuaded the parties to
include the exemptions were: (1) the need to attract a large member-
ship, and (2) the fact that their potential for abuse was unknown.
22
The strength of the multilateral agreement attempting to cope with a
global problem was fundamentally dependent upon the participation
of a sufficient number of the principal actors involved.1 23 CITES
eventually emerged containing trade exemptions because it was be-
lieved that their inclusion was necessary to attract signatories. 124 It
appears that this point was well taken, as the Conference originally
succeeded in attracting thirty-two signatories in 1973. However,
since over half of the international community subsequently ratified
CITES (including most of the major importing and exporting na-
tions), 25 an analysis of the present necessity of the exemptions must
consider whether the rationale of attracting membership is still ap-
propriate today. The answer depends upon whether the States that
121. Convention on the Export, Import and Transit of Certain Species of Wild Animals
and Plants, Second Revised Draft, art. I (Feb. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Second Revised
Draft] (unofficial copy on file with the California Western International Law Journal).
122. See Train, supra note 17, at 2.
123. See generally 0. SCHACHTER, M. NAWAZ & J. FRIED, TOWARD WIDER ACCEPT-
ANCE OF UN TREATIES (1971).
124. Interviews with Richard Parsons, supra note I11.
125. CITES was originally signed in 1973 by 32 nations. By 1980 membership had risen to
56 parties, and as of December, 1984 stands at 87. Most recently the Convention entered into
force for the People's Republic of the Congo on May 1, 1983; Belguim on Jan. 1, 1984; Algeria
on Feb. 21, 1984; Luxemburg on Mar. 12, 1984; Trinidad and Tobago on Apr. 19, 1984; Benin
on May 28, 1984; and the Netherlands on July 18, 1984.
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have ratified CITES since 1973 have done so primarily because the
treaty contained exemptions that made its trade restrictions convinc-
ingly palatable. This may be gleaned by evaluating the present likeli-
hood of parties denouncing the treaty if the exemptions were
repealed or significantly modified, which in turn depends upon an
analysis of the ecological, economical and political consequences of
the exemptions in question.' 26
The analysis is facilitated by the fact that in the ten years since
CITES entered into force the parties have had significant opportunity
to test their original suppositions.' 27 The abuses generated by the
126. Although some parties would oppose the repealing of certain exemptions, it is doubt-
ful that they would denounce CITES if a majority agreed to take such action. The EEC, for
example, agreed that the abuses resulting from the Convention's reservation clause outweighed
the benefits derived from the provision. Consequently, the EEC eliminated the reservation
provision when it adopted CITES in 1983. 26 U.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L384) 1 (1983). EEC
members such as France, Switzerland and Italy, who once had major reservations on several
species were forced to accept this decision, but nonetheless continue to implement the Conven-
tion. Similarly, it is reasonable to expect that severe limitations on or elimination of this or
other exemptions could be adopted by a majority of the Conference. Dissenting parties might
eventually recognize that the disadvantages of such action are minimal in comparison to the
derived benefit of more efficient overall implementation.
The EEC's ratification of CITES is simultaneously positive and negative in its effect on
wildlife trade. The beneficial aspects of the EEC regulation are that Greece and Ireland have
been forced to implement the Convention, although neither of these nations are parties. The
regulation also goes beyond CITES by requiring import permits for Appendix II and III spe-
cies. Furthermore, the regulation prohibits not only the importation of Appendix I specimens
for commercial purposes, but also "the display to the public for commercial purposes and the
sale, keeping for sale, offering for sale or transporting for sale of such specimens." Id. art. 6(1).
These positive considerations, however, are counterbalanced by the EEC's position that
the implementation of CITES "must not affect the free movement of products within the Com-
munity and must apply only to trade with third countries." Id. art. 9(2). The ramifications of
this rule raise many issues. For example, an Appendix II species originating in Kenya will
require an export permit to be admitted to Italy, but it will not require a permit if it is re-
exported from Italy to any EEC member. Moreover, a listed species originating in a Member
State will not require any permits to go to any other Member State. If an unscrupulous dealer
can find a single Member State where permits are easily obtained, large volumes of listed spe-
cies may be shipped into that country and then re-exported to other EEC States with impunity.
Moreover, the EEC regulation may encourage other groups of countries which allow free trade
amongst themselves to take similar action. If even a handful of such groups follow the EEC
lead the entire foundation of CITES will be undermined.
127. The United States National Authority, for example, is particularly concerned about
high trade volumes of Appendix II species such as pongolins, Caiman crocodiles, Sea turtles
and parrots. The United States has officially questioned whether CITES is being adequately
implemented as to trade in Appendix II species, and has requested assistance in determining if
additional measures should be taken in this area. Such action reflects a basic concern for the
overall effectiveness of CITES in controlling trade of potentially threatened species. United
States Management Authority, Review and Harmonization of Annual Reports (1984) [herein-
after cited as 1984 Annual Report] (United States Delegation's unofficial copy on file at Cali-
fornia Western International Law Journal).
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exemptions are no longer speculative as they were when the Conven-
tion was adopted over a decade ago. At the request of the Confer-
ence the Secretariat recently undertook a study of the nature and
extent of the problems of regulating the treaty's trade exemptions. 128
The results of this study were reported by the Secretariat, who noted
that an extraordinary divergence of national practice exists regarding
the exemptions. 129  The Secretariat cautioned the parties as to the
eroding effect the exemptions are having on the Convention's general
rules.'3 ° Moreover, the parties themselves have consistently identi-
fied the treaty's exemptions as providing perhaps the most damaging
loopholes to effective implementation. 3' Reliable data on the vol-
ume of trade by tourists and with nonparties has made what were
once vague suspicions now demonstrably real and concrete facts.
13 2
Examination of the effects of the exemptions is instructive in study-
ing their present viability.
1. Trade with Nonparties. One of the most controversial as-
pects of CITES is the Convention's willingness to allow parties to
freely trade wildlife with nonparties. 33 Nonparty trade in wildlife
comprises a substantial percentage of the overall global trade of en-
dangered species. " Moreover, a high percentage of illegal trade is
facilitated by the cooperation, tacit or explicit, of nonparty States. 35
Nations often decline to ratify CITES primarily because their wild-
life trade is extensive, and the treaty is viewed as a threat to contin-
ued economic benefits.' 36 The problem is further complicated by the
fact that the number of nonparties is not limited to countries who
have not signed the treaty. Parties to CITES may enter trade "reser-
128. San Jose Proceedings, supra note 96, Conf. 2.10.
129. Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Doc. 4.27.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., San Jose Proceedings, supra note 96, Conf. 2.5; New Delhi Proceedings,
supra note 57, Conf. 3.6; Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Conf. 4.9.
132. See supra note 8.
133. See, e.g., Wasserman, Washington Wildlife Convention, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 365
(1980).
134. Train, supra note 17, at 2. The Wildlife Trade Monitoring Unit estimates that legal
trade with nonparties comprises approximately thirty percent of the overall wildlife trade. Bot-
swana Proceedings, supra note 32, Doc. 4.18.
135. Nonparties such as Singapore engage in perhaps the largest trade volume of wildlife
products. Train, supra note 17, at 2; INSKIPP & WELLS, supra note 5, at 23-26.
136. This may be inferred by the large volumes of trade in which nonparties generally
engage. To illustrate, Singapore is one of the major markets for ivory and rhino horns. Mexico
engages in substantial volumes of trade in exotic birds and plants, especially cacti and suc-
culents. Train, supra note 17, at 2; INSKIPP & WELLS, supra note 5, at 23-26.
21
Schonfeld: International Trade in Wildlife: How Effective is the Endangered
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1985
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
vations" on listed species,' 37 which has the effect of making a signa-
tory a technical nonparty free of CITES regulations when trading
that particular species. Parties entering reservations are also moti-
vated by economics, as the reserved species usually represents a sub-
stantial economic resource.' 38 Accordingly, trade in reserved species
is also generaly heavy even though CITES recognizes them as requir-
ing strict protection.
Despite the significant danger that voluminous trade by nonpar-
ties (nonsignatories and reserving parties) poses to endangered wild-
life, CITES allows parties to trade listed species with nonparty
States.139 Trade with nonparties is conditioned only upon the re-
quirement that "competent authorities" of the nonparty issue "com-
parable documentation" which "substantially conforms" with
CITES permit issuance requirements."4 The Convention, however,
does not define the terms "comparable," "competent" or "substan-
tially." As a result, the parties are left with no objective method to
judge whether the nonparty has acted in accordance with the pur-
poses of the treaty.
The vagueness of this provision presents significant potential for
abuse when parties attempt to ascertain whether a nonparty has
"substantially conformed" with CITES permit issuance require-
ments. As detailed above, several crucial scientific findings must be
made before a listed species may be legally traded under CITES. 4 '
The reliability of a scientific finding determining that trade in a spe-
cific species will or will not be detrimental to the survival of their
wild population is one of the most important elements of the Conven-
137. CITES, supra note 14, art. XXIII. For example, as of Jan. 1, 1984, France, Japan and
Suriname had rtserved one or more species of Sea turtles (Chelonia mydas, Eretmochelys imbri-
cata, Lepidochelys coriacea); France, Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Japan, the Sudan, Thai-
land and Austria had reserved on one or more species of the Saltwater crocodile (Crocodylus
cataphractus, C. niloticus, C porosus, C siamensis, and Osteolaemus tetraspis). All of these
species are highly endangered and listed on Appendix I. New Dehli Proceedings, supra note
57, Doc. 3.22. See also Reservations Regarding the Reservation Clause, supra note 96, at 434-
46.
138. Notably, the USSR has entered six reservations on Appendix I species. Five of these
are on species of whales (Berardius spp., Hyperoodon spp., Balaenoptera acutorostata, B. edeni
and B. physalus), animals that represent a major industry in the Soviet Union. Japan, which
also relies heavily on the whaling industry, has reserved on six species of whales. Japan's re-
maining seven reservations are on reptilia such as crocodiles, sea turtles and monitor lizards.
Japan's reptile skin and shell industry is also substantial. See infra note 156.
139. CITES, supra note 14, art. X.
140. Id.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 56-74.
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tion's effectiveness.142 Erroneous judgments that allow trade when
wild populations cannot in fact tolerate such removal render the
treaty a futile attempt at wildlife management.143
The major weakness of the provision that allows trade with non-
party States is that CITES allows Party States to accept nonparty
scientific determinations which are critical to the viability of the
treaty."' Generally, the act of entering a reservation is an expression
by a reserving party that its immediate economic interest in the spe-
cies is paramount.'45 This position may be either expressly stated by
the nonparty or implied by its refusal to cooperate by signing the
treaty. Since trade with nonparties is conditioned only upon the
vague requirement that their scientific determinations "substantially
conform" with the Convention's permit provisions, a significant de-
gree of risk attends any acceptance by a party of a nonparty's "scien-
tific findings." This risk is magnified further by virtue of the priority
that nonparty's accord their vested short-term economic interests in
wildlife trade.
In response to the issues raised by allowing trade with nonpar-
ties, the Conference has consistently sought to minimize potential
threats to the Convention's goals by tackling the problem in a general
manner. Nonparties are strenuously urged to ratify the treaty. Bien-
nial conferences are open to observers who are permitted to partici-
pate in the proceedings, and nonparties are encouraged to attend in
the hope that they will be persuaded to eventually join the Conven-
tion. 146 Parties contemplating entering reservations are urged to
avoid doing so, and if they must, are encouraged to limit the use of
the practice. 147 The majority of non-reserving parties exert consider-
able pressure on those who have exercised the option to limit or re-
scind the use of reservations entirely.' 4  Although these general
requests are sometimes effective, ' 49 many States have still declined to
142. Interview with Art Lazarowitz, USFW Staff Specialist, in Washington D.C. (Jan. 5,
1984).
143. 1984 Annual Report, supra note 127.
144. CITES, supra note 14, art. X.
145. New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 57, Doc.3.22 (Report from the Secretariat on the
effects of Reservations).
146. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
147. Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Conf. 4.24.
148. Id. See generally Reservations Regarding the Reservation Clause, supra note 96.
149. The European Economic Community recently ratified CITES and completely prohib-
ited the use of reservations under Article XXIII. 26 U.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L384) 1 (1983).
For a brief outline of the issues surrounding the EEC's adoption of CITES, see supra note 126.
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ratify CITES, and many parties still retain reservations. 5 o
Perhaps the most effective response by the Convention to the
problem of trade with nonparties has been the compilation of lists of
nonparties which have been officially determined by the Secretariat
to meet CITES permit issuance standards.' 5 ' The continuing relia-
bility of these determinations is uncertain, however, as it is difficult to
ascertain whether nonparties will consistently meet the same stan-
dards. Moreover, parties are not required to respect these lists, but
are only urged to do so.' 5 2
The Convention has also attempted to clarify the wording of the
nonparty trade provision and thus provide the parties with a more
objective method by which to ascertain whether nonparties have
"substantially conformed" with the permit issuance requrements. At
the First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (Berne Proceed-
ings), the United States delegation recommended interpreting the
provision allowing trade with nonparties as requiring nonparties to
provide documentation "similar" to that acquired by the parties.
The Secretariat approved the recommendation and stated that its im-
plementation would avoid abuses of illegal trade by nonparties.' 53
However, the Conference has yet to define the term "similar." Thus,
the parties are left with another undefined term to work with.
By definition, the purpose of CITES is to prevent global over-
exploitative wildlife trade.'5 4 Curbing such trade between parties is
therefore only the means to achieve the end of preventing it globally.
Although abusive trade by nonparties is now recognized as a substan-
tial threat to long-term wildlife management,' 5 5 nonparties are often
able to contravene the Convention's purpose with the assistance of
Party States. Whether this occurs knowingly or unwittingly is irrele-
vant; CITES indirectly encourages and actually rewards nonparties
for refusing to cooperate in controlling over-exploitation, and often
bestows upon them a virtual monopoly in wildlife trade. To illus-
trate, Mexico, a nonparty, supplied over ninety percent of the turtle
leather imported into Japan in 1980.156 The economic rewards from
150. As of Jan. 1, 1984, the following parties still retained reservations: Japan (13), Swit-
zerland (9), France (7), USSR (6), Norway (4), Brazil (3), Peru (3), Thailand (3), Suriname (2),
Austria (2), Botswana (1), Zimbabwe (1), Zambia (1). CITES Secretariat, Notification to the
Parties No. 277, December 15, 1983. See also supra notes 137-38.
151. Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Doc. 4.8.
152. New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 57, Conf. 3.8.
153. Berne Proceedings, supra note 85, Doc.1.24.
154. CITES, supra note 14, preamble.
155. See supra notes 134-36.
156. Japan's imports included 160,000 kilograms of turtle skins; 70,846 kilograms of tor-
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such a monopoloy are an added incentive for nonparties to remain
independent of CITES, and the objectives of the treaty are signifi-
cantly defeated if they are allowed to benefit from their refusal to
cooperate in the international arena.' 57
The exemption of the treaty that allows loosely regulated trade
with nonparties should be repealed or strongly modified by the Con-
ference. The provisions of CITES that purport to limit the abuse of
this exemption are ineffective.'" 8 There is no objective method by
which to ascertain whether a nonparty's authorities are competent to
make trade decisions crucial to the survival of various wildlife spe-
cies. The high volume of trade by nonparties, and the reasonable
doubt as to the reliability of their scientific determinations engen-
dered by their refusal to join CITES, makes ascertaining conformity
with the treaty doubtful.
Elimination of the nonparty exemption would exert considerable
economic pressure on nonparties to ratify CITES and to cooperate in
promoting legitimate trade in non-endangered species. Since most of
the importing consumer nations are CITES signatories,' 59 repealing
the nonparty exemption would effectively eliminate the wildlife mar-
ket for nonparty exports. Nonparties would be forced to trade
amongst themselves, and the resulting loss of profits would make
such limited trade economically undesirable. Under these circum-
stances it is reasonable to predict that nonparties would find trade
with parties in non-endangered species more advantageous than
trade in endangered species limited to other nonparties. This would
result in the curbing of abusive trade by nonparties, and would also
encourage nonparties to cooperate in wildlife management within the
international community.
If the Conference is unwilling to completely prohibit wildlife
trade with nonparties, at a minimum CITES should be amended to
provide that before trade with a nonparty is allowed, a party's own
toise shell; and over 20,000 kilograms of turtle leather. Reservations Regarding the Reservation
Clause, supra note 96, at 444, citing TRAFFIC (USA), Memorandum to Sea Turtle Conserva-
tionists 3 (Feb. 12, 1981).
157. Mexico takes between 500,000 to 1,000,000 Olive ridley turtles (Lepidochelys olivacea)
from the Pacific coast annually, and it has been estimated that as a result the Baja California
population of Green sea turtles (Chelonia mydas) is currently in danger of extinction. 43 Fed.
Reg. 32,800, 32,803-804 (1978). Both species are listed in Appendix I.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 139-53.
159. Wildlife consuming nations generally include developed countries such as the United
States, Japan and the nations of Western Europe. The United States, for example, is estimated
to consume approximately twenty-five percent of all wildlife and wildlife products. Interviews
with Linda McMahan, supra note 1.
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authority must determine that the nonparty has complied with the
treaty's safeguards, and not just that the nonparty's documentation
conforms. In this way officials representing governments that have
demonstrated a concern for CITES objectives will make the neces-
sary scientific determinations, instead of just checking the paperwork
issued by governments that may not.
2. Tourist Souvenir Specimens and Personal Effects. Another
exception to the Convention's general trade restrictions is made in
situations where departing or arriving tourists claim listed species as
souvenirs or personal effects. The income generated from the sale of
tourist souvenir specimens represents a substantial source of revenue
for many countries. 160 Parts, products and derivatives of endangered
species sold to tourists comprise a high percentage of the overall
global wildlife trade. t6 Exotic furs, jewelry and pets are regularly
purchased by tourists travelling abroad.' 6 2 Big game hunters on sa-
fari kill animals to take home as trophies, and rare live specimens are
in high demand by collectors.' 63 The intense demand on a limited
supply of animals and plants make this market particularly lucrative,
and over-exploitation consequently poses a serious threat to wildlife
conservation and long term business interests if not closely
controlled. "
160. INSKIPP & WELLS, supra note 5, at 27.
161. For example, the Sudan limits the commercial export of crocodile hides to European
tanners to 60,000 per year, but it allows unlimited killing and stuffing of crocodiles for the
tourist trade. It has been estimated that there may be as many as 100,000 in Sudanese souvenir
shops at any one time. INSKIPP & WELLS, supra note 5, at 20; CADIEUX, supra note 7, at 171-
172.
162. See supra note 5.
163. South Africa grants permits at R 5,000 apiece to kill a single rhinoceros. The govern-
ment believes that there is actually a surplus of rhinoceri in the Pretoriuskop-Stolznek area of
South Africa's Kruger Park. Johannesburg Star, July 17, 1982, at 2, col. 1. It is estimated that
"the average big game hunter leaves more than 5,000 American dollars in each African country
in which he hunts." CADIEUX, supra note 7, at 170. Many developing nations have used this
supply of foreign exchange to manage the hunting of species such as the Spotted leopard, which
some contend is plentiful in the wild. CITES now lists the leopard on Appendix I, and some
have argued that the resulting loss of income from big game hunting has caused several small
African nations to stop their anti-poaching efforts entirely. Id. at 171. See generally New
Dehli Proceedings, supra note 57, Doc. 3.5 annex 5.
164. For example, in the early 1960's the Mountain gorilla population on the Zaire-
Rwanda border was estimated at only 500. By 1980 their numbers were further reduced to
approximately 250, primarily as a result of habitat destruction. In recent years, however, go-
rilla skulls have also been in high demand as souvenirs for tourists. As of 1976 at least sixteen
males had been killed for their skulls. In 1978 the dominant male was killed in a troop in
which no other males had reached a level of maturity sufficient to keep the group cohesive. As
a result the entire troop may perish. INSKIPP & WELLS, supra note 5, at 32.
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CITES does not allow exemptions for Appendix I specimens
claimed as personal effects.' 65 The returning tourist must therefore
obtain and present valid import and export permits to move Appen-
dix I specimens in and out of a party's territory. 166 In certain cir-
cumstances, however, CITES exempts Appendix II and III species
from usual import and export restrictions when they are claimed as
tourist souvenirs or personal effects. 167 In situations where Appendix
II specimens were not taken from the wild and are claimed as per-
sonal effects, they can be imported without the requirement of an
export permit.'16  In situations where Appendix II specimens were
taken from the wild (such as occurs in hunting), they can also be
imported without a permit, unless the exporting State specifically re-
quires an export permit for that species. 169 Most exporting countries
do not requre export permits for Appendix II species claimed as per-
sonal items.' 70 As a result, such specimens move freely between par-
ties without any trade restrictions. The exemption thereby prevents
parties from exercising any control over the potential danger
presented by uncurtailed tourist trade.
The problem is further intensified by the Convention's failure to
define the term "personal effect" or "tourist souvenir specimen."'
17 1
The terms are, at the very least, impliedly representative of speci-
mens distinguishable from items destined for commercial sale. In
practice, the distinction is based on the volume of the items sought to
be imported or exported. Generally speaking, the larger the ship-
ment the more likely customs inspectors will consider it destined for
commercial sale as opposed to classifying it as a tourist souvenir.
17 2
Nevertheless, the failure to define these terms creates an enormous
165. CITES, supra note 14, art. VII (3)(a).
166. The problems associated with Appendix I tourist souvenirs specimens are enforcement
related. Consequently, the Conference's efforts at curbing tourist trade of Appendix I speci-
mens have been directed at increasing effective implementation of Article III, as opposed to
modifying its language. For example, at the Botswana Proceedings the Conference urged all
parties to "vigorously control" trade in Appendix I specimens, whether or not they are claimed
as personal effects. Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Conf. 4.12.
167. CITES, supra note 14, art. VII (3)(b)(i-iii).
168. Id. art. VII (3)(b).
169. Id. art. VII (3)(c).
170. Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Conf. 4.12. For example, Morocco theoreti-
cally prohibits all commercial wildlife trade. Nevertheless, in practice customs authorities
rarely prohibit tourists or pseudo-tourists from exporting specimens. This is particularly true
in the case of falcons, which are regularly sought in Morocco from citizens of the Federal
Republic of Germany. New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 57, Doc. 3.5 annex 5.
171. Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Conf. 4.12.
172. San Jose Proceedings, supra note 96, Doc. 2.18.2.
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grey area, and often allows exemptions in situations where it is
doubtful the parties intended one to exist.
Customs officials, for example, frequently observe the same tour-
ists or "pseudo-tourists" regularly crossing the border with Appen-
dix II specimens claimed as personal items. t73 Tourists are not
legally limited by the treaty as to the number of items they may freely
claim as exempt from restrictions under the souvenir clause.
Although officials may suspect that many Appendix II specimens
claimed as tourist souvenirs are being imported for commercial
rather than personal purposes, the Convention provides no guidelines
for allowing officials to challenge alleged violations perpetrated via
this exemption. Furthermore, trade records of specimens claimed as
personal effects are not required by CITES.174 Consequently there is
often no method available to ascertain the degree to which trade in
specimens claimed as tourist souvenirs threatens the survival of Ap-
pendix II species.' 75 If trade in tourists items is in fact causing seri-
ous damage to a particular species, the parties have no formal
evidence upon which a convincing case may be established. Failure
to define the term personal effect and thereby limit its parameters,
may allow further abuse of a trade exemption which already repre-
sents a major loophole in CITES.
Aware of these problems, but under heavy pressure by many
States to retain the status quo, the Conference has consistently
sought to minimize the problems presented by trade of tourist souve-
nirs and pets without eliminating the provision. For example, at the
Fourth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (Botswana Proceed-
ings) the Conference recommended limiting the use of the personal
effects exemption by not applying the term "tourist souvenir" to live
specimens."' Although the recommendation would still permit the
unfettered use of the exemption for wildlife products, it would elimi-
nate the over-exploitative tourist trade of live specimens of Appendix
II species. Birds, reptiles and plants, the categories of living wildlife
most often sought and moved by tourists, would be protected from
173. Telephone interview with Marvin Jones, Chief Registrar of the San Diego Zoo, in San
Diego, CA (Sept. 29, 1983).
174. CITES, supra note 14, art. VIII (6)(b).
175. Interviews with Linda McMahan, supra note 1.
176. Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Conf. 4.12. Another example of the devastating
effect tourist trade can have on a precarious population of certain species occurred in 1980,
when a substantial part of the remaining population of the Green sea snail entered the United
Kingdom on a necklace strung around the neck of a returning British tourist. Botswana Pro-
ceedings, supra note 32, Doc. 4.24.
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abuse by the use of the personal effects exemption.' 77
Ironically, the parties at the Botswana Proceedings also recom-
mended broadening the "tourist souvenir" exemption in certain cir-
cumstances. The language of CITES allows the personal effects
exemption to be applied only when the owner is entering his State of
usual residence."7 ' The Conference, however, recommended that
persons in possession of Appendix II specimens covered by an export
permit be afforded the exemption for personal effects when entering
States other than their State of usual residence.I79 In practical effect,
this allows tourists to move souvenir items across a multiplicity of
international borders. The Conference modified this expansion, how-
ever, by allowing the new exemption only in situations where an ex-
port permit has been issued by the exporting country. °80 Thus, the
Conference hoped to guarantee that Appendix II specimens will not
be over-exploited through tourist trade by requiring the exporting
country to determine that removal will not be detrimental to the spe-
cies' survival.'' Nevertheless, both recommendations indicate an
unwillingness on behalf of the parties to dispense entirely with the
tourist souvenir exemption. Although the limitation on live speci-
mens claimed as personal effects represents a significant compromise,
the economic value of tourist trade to exporting nations 8 2 has made
the Conference unwilling to repeal the exemption despite the concern
many parties have expressed over the tourist trade.
Regardless of the deadlock on this issue, the general consensus
of the parties is that heavy trade reported in Appendix II specimens
is of paramount concern. 8 3 Accordingly, the tourists souvenir ex-
emption that allows Appendix II trade should be closely scrutinized,
and any relaxing of what limits are presently placed on tourist trade
should be avoided. In keeping with the present attempt to tighten
CITES controls, any indication of a willingness to allow further ex-
pansion of a provision that already allows abuse of wildlife popula-
tions should be discouraged.
Although Appendix I specimens claimed as personal effects are
not exempted from CITES trade restrictions,8 4 additional measures
177. Id.
178. CITES, supra note 14, art. VII (3)(b)(ii).
179. Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Conf. 4.12.
180. Id.
181. See CITES, supra note 14, art. IV.
182. See supra note 5.
183. See, e.g., 1984 Annual Report, supra note 127.
184. CITES, supra note 14, art. VII (3)(a).
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must be taken to insure that they are adequately protected. Confisca-
tion of Appendix I specimens when a tourist returns home may pro-
vide a disincentive to purchase wildlife products in the future.
185
However, as long as tourists purchase endangered wildlife items at all
the exporters have an incentive to remove such species from their
habitats. The trader does not care whether the item he sold a tourist
eventually sits on the customer's coffee table or in a USFW ware-
house. The main focus of preventing wildlife exploitation is therefore
one of preventing the original removal from the wild,' 86 which will
only occur if the market for such products sharply declines. If en-
dangered wildlife cannot be sold because tourists refuse to buy prod-
ucts they know cannot be legally imported, traders will find the
business untenable. Tourists must therefore be made aware of
CITES restrictions before they purchase wildlife abroad, and not
merely when they are returning home after having monetarily re-
warded the exporter.
Educating the public of CITES restrictions and domestic wild-
life laws is of primary importance. Prominent exhibits displaying il-
legal wildlife products and explaining trade restrictions, such as those
currently in use at the Los Angeles and San Francisco International
Airports, should be employed at all major international airports.' 87
Sufficient supplies of confiscated products make this endeavor highly
practical. '88
3. "Readily Recognizable Specimens." The language of CITES
contains a linguistic loophole that exempts wildlife from the treaty's
safeguards if it is too difficult for a party to identify a specimen as a
listed species.' 89 The treaty regulates the trade of "specimens" of
species listed in the treaty's appendices. Specimen is defined by the
Convention as "any readily recognizable part or derivative of a plant
185. See infra note 269.
186. The issue has been raised that perhaps some parties have lost sight of this postulate,
and are concentrating instead on the easier task of confiscating products imported into their
countries. The argument has been advanced that the United States, for example, should focus
its efforts to implement CITES more heavily on effecting changes on the international level.
This would involve more attention devoted towards preventing the removal of threatened spe-
cies from the wild, and less on after the fact apprehension of the consumer. Interviews with
Richard Parsons, supra note 111.
187. Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Doc. 4.8.10.1.
188. See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
189. The original drafts of the Convention provided that trade regulations would apply to
.any specimen." The final draft of CITES, however, contained the qualified "any readily rec-
ognizable" specimen. See Second Revised Draft, supra note 121.
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or animal."' 9 ° The term readily recognizable, however, is not defined
by the Convention and is therefore subject to each party's judg-
ment.19' Consequently, an exporting country whose national author-
ity cannot or does not wish to recognize a specimen as a listed species
is not bound by the treaty's regulations regarding trade of that speci-
men. 192 The most important problem that this anomaly presents is
that it puts the Convention in the position of implicitly tolerating the
inadequacy of a party's technical identification skills. Furthermore,
it provides parties with a justification for trading a species it may not
have wanted listed without requiring the party to go through the for-
malities of entering a reservation, the use of which often has political
consequences. '93
The individual ability of each party to accurately identify speci-
mens of listed species is crucial to effective enforcement of CITES.' 94
The majority of wildlife trade today consists of trade in parts and
derivatives of species as opposed to live specimens."' Although it is
often very difficult to identify live specimens, identification of parts
and derivatives can sometimes be almost impossible even for a
trained zoologist or botanist. 196 If customs officials do not readily
recognize a specimen presented for shipment as a protected species,
the specimen may be exported without a permit. Appendix I species
may be traded for commercial purposes, and Appendix II and III
species may be shipped without guarantee that the export of the spec-
imen will not be detrimental to the species' wild population. Never-
theless, this trade is legal under a strict construction of the language
of the treaty.' 97
An example of this problem is illustrated by trade of the
Saltwater crocodile and the American alligator. The Saltwater croc-
odile is currently one of the most highly endangered species of ani-
190. See supra note 51.
191. Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Conf. 4.8.
192. CITES, supra note 14, arts. I (b)(2); 11 (1-3); III (1); IV (1); V (1).
193. See Reservations Regarding the Reservation Clause, supra note 96, at 454.
194. Interview with Tom Striegler, Special Agent in Charge of Branch Investigations,
USFW Division of Law Enforcement, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 6, 1984).
195. The Convention defines specimen as "any animal, whether dead or alive, and any
readily recognizable part or derivative thereof." CITES, supra note 14, art. I (b). Examples of
"parts" include such items as tanned skins, elephant or walrus ivory, and eagle feathers. "De-
rivatives" include items such as whale oil, jewelry made from turtle shells or bear claws, fur
coats and snakeskin shoes. See also INSKIPP & WELLS, supra note 5, at 27.
196. CADIEUX, supra note 7, at 170.
197. See CITES, supra note 14, arts I (b)(2); 11 (1-3); Ill (1); IV (1); V (1).
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mals. 19 s The American alligator, on the other hand, is abundant in
the southeastern portion of the United States and is not a listed spe-
cies. '99 Once a reptile's hide is salted, tanned and processed into ul-
tra chic handbags and shoes, it is difficult to tell whether the item
originated from a crocodile or an alligator.2 ° ° If a product cannot be
recognized as originating from a crocodile, then CITES regulations
do not apply. The item is allowed into trade, and if it did originate
from the listed species the inability or refusal to identify it as such
produces results clearly in contravention of the purpose of the treaty.
A more complex and particularly damaging aspect of the "read-
ily recognizable" loophole occurs when traded specimens are deemed
readily recognizable by one party but not by another.2 °1 If the ex-
porting country does not consider the specimen readily recognizable
it will arrive at the State of importation unaccompanied by CITES
permits, offered as a shipment technically outside of the Convention's
scope. The importing country, however, may recognize the specimen
as a listed species. Narrowly construed CITES allows the importing
country to waive the permits required for admission even though it
recognizes the specimen as protected.20 2 This interpretation is com-
monly relied upon, and particularly frustrates the purpose of CITES
since a party may circumvent trade regulations by relying on this
provision. Furthermore, despite even good faith attempts at compli-
ance by the exporting country, a species may not receive the required
protection simply because the exporting party is less skilled in the
identification process than the importing party.
The Conference has recommended various proposals to correct
abuses arising from the "readily recognizable" loophole. 203 The most
significant of these suggestions have been focused on addressing the
general problem of specimen identification. The compilation of a
uniform identification manual was delegated to a working committee
at the Second Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (San Jose
Proceedings) in 1979."° The Committee has yet to complete the
198. CITES, supra note 14, Appendix I; 4 TRAFFIC, 1982 Newsletter No. 2, at 1. See
also Reservations Regarding the Reservation Clause, supra note 96, at 439-43.
199. See CITES, supra note 14, Appendix I, II & I1.
200. CADIEUX, supra note 7, at 170.
201. Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Conf. 4.8.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Conf. 4.8, Doc. 4.21 annex 1; New
Delhi Proceedings, supra note 57, Conf. 3.18, Doc. 3.5 annex 4; San Jose Proceedings, supra
note 96, Conf. 2.4; Berne Proceedings, supra note 85, Doc. 1.19.
204. San Jose Proceedings, supra note 96, Conf. 2.4.
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manual, 20 5 due primarily to its complexity and increasing cost. 20 6
At the Botswana Proceedings the parties also addressed the is-
sue of importation of parts and derivatives that have been deemed
unrecognizable by the exporting country but are identified by the im-
porting party as a listed species. 2 7 The Conference recognized that
the practice by importing parties of waiving export requirements
based upon the readily recognizable loophole represents a significant
weakness of the treaty.208 Several proposals were made by various
parties to correct this problem. 20 9  The United Kingdom recom-
mended that specimens deemed unrecognizable by an exporting
country should be treated as if that party had taken a reservation on
the species.210 Under this interpretation the exporting country would
be treated as a nonparty regarding trade of the unrecognizable spe-
cies, 21 1 and could thereby legally conduct trade in those specimens
with other nonparties and with parties as long as the remaining re-
quirements of the treaty were satisfied.212
The United States delegation objected to this proposal, noting
that it would allow a party to enter a reservation without complying
with the formal procedures necessary to take such a serious action.213
It was pointed out that the proposal would in essence encourage ex-
porting parties to adopt rigid lists of parts and derivatives that it
deemed recognizable.21 4 Species not listed on a party's "recognizable
list" would thereby automatically become exempt from CITES trade
restrictions, and would officially lose the protection of the treaty.
This, it was argued, would release parties from the responsibility of
attempting to identify specimens difficult to recognize, and would
thereby result in much less effort devoted to the identification prob-
205. At the Botswana Proceedings in 1983, the Parties decided to extend the still uncom-
pleted mandate of the Indentification Manual Committee to the Fifth Meeting of the Confer-
ence of Parties in April 1985. The Conference invited parties to submit, in consultation with
the Committee, appropriate contributions to further the completion of the identification man-
ual. Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Conf. 4.19.
206. Id.
207. Id. Conf. 4.8.
208. Id. Doc. 4.21.
209. See, e.g., New Dehli Proceedings, supra note 57, Doc. 3.30.1.
210. Id. See also Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Doc. 4.21 annex. See supra text
accompanying note 137.
211. Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Doc. 4.21 annex.
212. Id.
213. Interview with Art Lazarowitz, supra note 142. See also CITES, supra note 14, art.
XXIII.
214. This proposal would sanction the use of qualified sub-lists of CITES appendices. In-
terview with Art Lazarowitz, supra note 142.
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lem in general.215
The United Kingdom proposal was defeated and in the alterna-
tive the Conference urged that importing parties no longer grant
waivers based upon an exporting party's determination that certain
specimens are unrecognizable.2 16 The Conference explicitly inter-
preted the treaty to provide that when an importing party recognizes
a listed species it has the right to refuse entry unless a valid export
permit is presented,2 17 regardless of the exporting party's
determination.
Although this resolution offers some protection by providing
concerned importing parties with a legal basis for refusing entry
where exporting parties have been unable or unwilling to recognize
and thereby protect listed species, it confronts the overall identifica-
tion problem in an indirect manner. By focusing on the symptoms of
identification problems the resolution is only effective in situations
where the importing party has sufficiently superior technical skill and
is also willing to adhere to the resolution's strict interpretation of the
treaty's language and return the specimens to the exporting nation.2 I8
If the importing country does not have both this expertise and deter-
mination, the resolution as it stands is functionally useless because it
does not otherwise impose any additional obligation upon either im-
porting or exporting States.219 It could be butressed, however, by
establishing a presumption that would require treating a species as
listed where there was a reasonable doubt on behalf of any party.
This concept has already been adopted in the United States. The
Endangered Species Act (ESA) provides that "a species may be listed
as endangered when they so closely resemble in appearance an en-
dangered species that enforcement personnel would have substantial
difficulties differentiating them. ' 220  Although this procedure has
been a subject of heated debate when proposed for CITES appendi-
ces, the distinction here is that the presumption would not apply to
listing a species, but to identifying species already listed. 22 1 Such an
alternative seems a reasonable compromise between the United
215. Id.
216. Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Conf. 4.8.
217. Id.
218. In such a case the exporting State will be given a clear message to increase its identifi-
cation skills. It will be less inclined to trade questionable species without first making the
necessary determinations, and if appropriate, issuing an export permit.
219. See Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Conf. 4.8.
220. 16 U.S.C.A. 1533(e)(A).
221. See Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Conf. 4.8; New Dehli Proceedings, supra
note 57, Doc. 3.30.1.
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States' workable regulation under the ESA and the Convention's res-
olution attempting to rectify the problem.
The loophole created by the application of CITES to only read-
ily recongizable specimens is perhaps linguistically and practically
unavoidable.222 Clearly parties cannot apply the treaty to specimens
that cannot be recognized. Nevertheless, it does not follow that ac-
tion cannot be taken to reduce the abuses resulting from the wording
of this clause. The more direct approach of tackling the general
problem of identification skills addresses the issue at its core. To help
aid in increasing a party's identification skills the identification man-
ual being prepared by the Identification Manual Committee223
should be supplemented with samples of wildlife products. These
samples could be readily supplied from stocks that have been confis-
cated by parties enforcing CITES. More than enough material is
presently available to distribute a wide variety of samples to all par-
ties.224 In the United States, for example, high volumes of confis-
cated wildlife products occupy government storerooms and
warehouses.225 The problem of storage could be solved by distribut-
ing these items to domestic and foreign officials responsible for in-
specting wildlife shipments. Moreover, the Conference should
consider establishing a committee composed of identification experts
responsible for traveling to Party States to train and assist national
authorities in identification procedures. 26 Once initial contact was
made, parties would be able to rely on their own personnel for train-
ing programs.
Despite the significance of the Convention's inherent weak-
nesses, authorities and commentators nevertheless agree that CITES
is a fundamentally sound and workable mechanism.227 Effective im-
222. See supra text accompanying notes 189-202.
223. See San Jose Proceedings, supra note 96, Conf. 2.4.
224. Id. The United States and Canada already cooperate in exchanging wildlife samples
for identification purposes. The United States has also extended a general offer to supply sam-
ples to other parties, some of whom have accepted the proffer. Interview with Tom Striegler,
supra note 194.
225. For example, the USFW suite at Los Angeles International Airport is filled to capac-
ity with confiscated wildlife products. In 1981 the collection had grown so huge and cumber-
some that the government was forced to dispose of over five million dollars worth of illegal
goods. Jones, 'Garage Sale' To Offer Some Rare Buys, L.A. Times, Nov. 8, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
226. The Conference has already established a Technical Committee to assist parties who
are unable to unilaterally determine and regulate levels of trade of Appendix II specimens that
allows "the maintenance of those species throughout their ranges at levels consistent with their
roles in the ecosystems in which they occur." Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Conf. 4.7.
227. Interviews with Linda McMahan, supra note 1; Richard Parsons, supra note I11;
Michael Bean, supra note 113; Art Lazarowitz, supra note 142; Tom Striegler, supra note 194.
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plementation, however, has been severely undermined by the treaty's
major problem area: poor and inconsistent enforcement by Party
States. Unless corrective measures in this area are successful, modifi-
cation of the treaty's trade exemptions22 will at best result in margi-
nal improvements. It is with an understanding of this gestalt that the
Conference today focuses its primary efforts on attaining greater and
more consistent enforcement of CITES.229
B. Inefficient Enforcement
Prior to 1975 the international trade in endangered species was
conducted legally in open commerce. Today CITES either prohibits
or significantly restricts such trade in over half the nations of the
world. Consequently, a substantial shift in wildlife trade patterns
and procedures has emerged since CITES entered into force.23°
Those who continue to trade in endangered wildlife do so either by
smuggling or by purporting to conduct legal trade.231 Trading under
the guise of legality is accomplished primarily by laundering CITES
documentation. 23 2 Currently over one-third of the total international
wildlife trade is illegal, that is, in violation of CITES or domestic
law. 233 Over one-third of the illegal trade is perpetrated by launder-
ing. - 4 Thus, the business is "not just a cloak and dagger operation
anymore. It's becoming a complex paper chase. ' 235 In the attempt
to keep up with increasingly sophisticated illegal operations, the par-
ties have been plagued by inefficient communication both between
themselves and within their own domestic infrastructures, and by a
lack of consistently effective deterrence via domestic laws and
sanctions.
1. Ineffective Communication. Confusion regarding import
and export permits is a major symptom of inefficient communication
between and within the parties. In 1980 the Technical Expert Com-
mittee established to assist parties examined documentation from a
sampling of thirty-five countries and found over half to be invalid.23 6
228. See supra text accompanying notes 122-226.
229. Train, supra note 17.
230. Hanley, supra note 4.
231. Id.
232. See infra text accompanying notes 313-19.
233. Hanley, supra note 4.
234. Laundering is the "concealing of, or disguising of source . . . as by chanelling through
an intermediary." WEBSTER'S, supra note 10, at 1278.
235. Tonfexsis, supra note I (statement of Linda McMahan, Director of TRAFFIC-USA).
236. Wasserman, supra note 133, at 365. See also supra note 226.
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Although CITES requires that an export permit contain the informa-
tion specified in the example set forth in the Convention text,23 7 it
does not require the use of that model.238 Parties use a wide variety
of permits and often change the type of form they issue. 239 As a result
of this fluctuation one party frequently does not know what permits
are being used by another. The situation is further complicated by
the fact that many parties frequently change the personnel responsi-
ble for authenticating permits issued.2 1 Moreover, it is not uncom-
mon in many countries for the entire office of a party's national
authority to be transferred to another division of the government,
which results in a constant changing of officials authorized to grant
and issue permits. 241 All of these factors combine to create a situa-
tion in which customs officials often have no method by which to
determine whether permits presented with shipments of listed species
are genuine or forgeries.242 Consequently, many shipments of endan-
gered wildlife are allowed entry based upon forged documentation.243
An example of the difficulties presented by permit non-uniform-
ity was graphically illustrated when Bolivia announced that as of
January 1983 it would use a CITES permit form printed in Switzer-
land and modeled upon the example set forth in the treaty. 244 The
new head of the Bolivian Management Authority, however, stated
that 150 permits of the old format used prior to the new CITES ver-
sion had "disappeared. ' 245 The Secretariat promptly informed the
parties to reject any old format Bolivian permits issued after Novem-
ber 23, 1983.246 Unless this information was effectively disseminated
to all national authorities and enforcement agencies operating under
their auspices, substantial illegal trade could have resulted. Since one
shipment of rare species can represent thousands of animals or plants
and millions of dollars,247 the impact of 150 forged permits is
significant.
237. CITES, supra note 14, art. VI (2).
238. See New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 57, Conf. 3.6(c).
239. See Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Conf. 4.9.
240. Interviews with Richard Parsons, supra note 111.
241. Canada, for example, has over 100 officials representing thirteen governmental agen-
cies authorized to sign permits. Berne Proceedings, supra note 85, Doc. 1.25.5.
242. Interview with Tom Striegler, supra note 194.
243. The process of verifying the authenticity of permits and signatures is further compli-
cated by the language barrier. The eighty-seven parties of CITES represent a multiplicity of
languages.
244. Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, at Doc. 4.8.12.2.
245. Id.
246. 5 TRAFFIC, 1983 Newsletter No. 1, at 10.
247. Hanley, supra note 4.
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The Conference has adopted various resolutions in an attempt to
rectify the abuses resulting from permit non-uniformity. The parties
have been urged to adopt the contents and format of their export
permits to the standard CITES model,24 and to print permits in at
least one of the working languages of the Convention.249 Since the
benefits of adopting one uniform export permit to be used by all par-
ties have long been recognized, the procedure should be formally
mandated.2 50 A "CITES Directory" containing relevant information
on all management and scientific authorities has been issued to the
parties, and is updated as new notifications are forwarded to the Sec-
retariat.25' It remains to be seen whether these measures will be suffi-
cient to correct the problem.
Communication difficulties caused by parties' internal bureau-
cracies also diminish effective enforcement. This is often primarily
the result of complex governmental infrastructures established to im-
plement CITES. Many parties lack a clear division of authority over
the Convention's management. Often a party's intra-governmental
hierarchy provides for separate branches designed to handle various
aspects of CITES implementation.252 These branches are frequently
disassociated to the degree that authorities are unable to respond in a
coordinated fashion to problems that arise in the area of treaty
enforcement.253
In the United States, for example, CITES is handled by a maze
of different agencies. The management and scientific authorities are
controlled by separate offices. 254 The Office of Scientific Authority of
248. New Dehli Proceedings, supra note 57, Conf. 3.6. Model export permits are contained
in Appendix IV.
249. Id. The working languages of CITES are English, French and Spanish.
250. New Dehli Proceedings, supra note 57, Conf. 3.6. Compare CITES with Hague Con-
ference on International Law, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638 (requiring use
of standardized form for personal service of process abroad).
251. Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Doc. 4.8.
252. In Paraguay, for example, the Ministry of Agriculture is generally responsible for
CITES. The National Forest Service is the division within the Ministry of Agriculture which
implements the Convention, although a different department issues permits. The Ministries of
Defense and of the Treasury also issue permits, despite the fact that these departments have no
scientific expertise. New Dehli Proceedings, supra note 57, Doc. 3.5 annex.
253. Id. The Bolivian National Authority is greatly hampered in implementing CITES due
to a lack of efficient infrastructure. The Forestry Development Center, a division of the Minis-
try of Agriculture, is generally responsible for issuing CITES permits. However, all staff mem-
bers of the Center have forestry backgrounds, and the lack of trained zoologists makes
compliance with CITES extremely difficult at best. Identification control is practically nonexis-
tent, as species are only known by their common names. Moreover, the Ministry of Industry
and Commerce may also grant permits. Id.
254. 50 C.F.R. § 23.
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the United States Fish and Wildlife Department (USFW), for exam-
ple, after reaching a decision to modify a species trade status, must
notify the USFW Branch of Permits, a division of the United States
Management Authority.2"5 The decision is then relayed to the
USFW Division of Law Enforcement. The mandate must then sift
down through seven regional USFW law enforcement offices located
throughout the country.256  These offices must then notify their
agents in the field. This entire process often takes a considerable
amount of time. Moreover, substantial discretion is exercised by
these offices on what information of the bulk of data received is
passed on to individual agents. The accuracy of the relayed informa-
tion is often unavoidably diluted in the dissemination process.27
USFW agents and customs inspectors also exercise considerable
discretion in enforcing CITES, since they actually check permits and
inspect shipments of wildlife.258 Customs line inspectors presented
with wildlife are required to detain the shipment until a USFW agent
can arrive to carry out the necessary inspection procedures. For ex-
ample, Customs inspectors at San Ysidro, California, (immediately
north of the United States-Mexican border) must detain wildlife ship-
ments until an agent can arrive from the nearest USFW office in Los
Angeles, over 150 miles away. The number of agents available is
extremely limited in comparison to the territory and ports that must
be covered.259 Moreover, large numbers of wildlife parts and deriva-
tives are imported without detection due to the inability of Customs
inspectors to realize that certain items are in fact wildlife products. 26
For example, fur coats and jewelry often escape notice due to the
commonplace nature of such items. The problem is further intensi-
fied by the fact that there is substantial pressure on Customs to pro-
cess shipments quickly, as unduly delayed shipments adversely affect
the commerce of the United States. A conflict therefore arises when
USFW agents are unable to respond to the multitude of inspection
requests as quickly as might be desired.
To add to the complexity, USFW agents are responsible for en-
255. Id.
256. See 7 ENDANGERED SPECIES TECHNICAL BULLETIN 2 (1983).
257. Interviews with Richard Parsons, supra note 111.
758. For example, in 1983 approximately 55,000 wildlife imports were declared. Of these,
approximately 15,000 were physically inspected. The remaining imports were cleared on the
basis of paperwork alone. Interview with Tom Striegler, supra note 194.
259. There are presently 6,400 Customs agents and thirty-five USFW inspectors employed
in the United States. Id.
260. Interviews with Richard Parsons, supra note I11.
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forcing a staggering number of wildlife regulations, only one of
which is CITES.26 ' These include the Endangered Species Act,262
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,2 63 the Lacey Act2 64 and violations
on federal and Indian land.265 Moreover, Customs is responsible for
enforcing a huge volume of tariff regulations, within which wildlife is
not a designated category. Congress has also provided that Customs
must administer over fifty laws that have nothing to do with duties.
In light of the degree of discretion exercised by line inspectors and
agents, it is crucial that these officials are kept current on pertinent
information relevant to the enforcement of the treaty. The bureau-
cratic system, however, is often directly responsible for preventing
this from occurring.
Examples of information breakdown problems in the United
States caused by the bureaucratic system are numerous. Agents in
the field are often unaware of updates on CITES issues contained in
the Federal Register.266 One or two of the Regional offices have re-
portedly taken the position that on operational issues (such as what
goods to seize) their individual discretion allows them to dismiss di-
rections from the head offices in Washington, D.C.267  In additon,
interagency distrust is often the cause of substantial delays in
processing shipments of wildlife.268  American citizens returning
home frequently get erroneous information from United States em-
bassies on what wildlife products they can legally import, and upon
arriving at customs their goods are often confiscated despite their
good faith attempts to comply with the law.2 69
Lack of a sufficient quantity of qualified wildlife agents is by no
means a problem exclusive to the United States.270 When inspectors
261. Interview with Tom Striegler, supra note 194.
262. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1543 (1973 & Supp. III 1979).
263. Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1976)).
264. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 3371-3378.
265. See also supra note 25 and legislation contained therein.
266. Interviews with Richard Parsons, supra note 111.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. One case, for example, involved a United States citizen who while travelling
abroad contacted her embassy as to the legality of importing a $20,000 necklace made from
rare turtle shell. After being informed that the importation would not violate any regulations,
she was quite surprised when the necklace was confiscated by United States Customs as a
violation of CITES. Cf Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947) (errone-
ous advice given by government employee not binding on government); Schweiker v. Hansom,
450 U.S. 785 (1981) (same).
270. Another example of the scope of the difficulties encountered as a result of limited
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are not well informed, preposterous situations can occur. For exam-
ple, a party was recently presented with a shipment of wild penguins
for import.27" ' The export permit listed the birds as originating in
Paraguay, a landlocked country in South America with a tropical
climate. It is well known that penguins are marine animals generally
indigenous to the polar regions. Nevertheless, inspectors allowed the
birds entrance despite the "obvious" invalidity of the export
permit.27 2
Although the complex internal bureaucracy that often accompa-
nies the implementation of CITES usually cannot be avoided, steps
can be taken to minimize the adverse effects of such systems. For
example, USFW has recently installed a computer system into its of-
fices and regional branches.27 3 All designated points of entry for
wildlife shipments should also utilize this system. In this way cur-
rent lists of the Appendix status of listed species and updates on par-
ties' acting national authorities and wildlife laws can be
maintained. 7 4 Adequate funding by Congress and approval of the
executive branch is obviously critical in solving many of these
problems. 7 5
Domestic internal bureaucracy can also cause communication
problems on the international level. CITES provides that the Secre-
tariat shall act as a switchboard in relaying information between the
parties. In theory, national authorities communicating through the
Secretariat are to work together unfettered by customary diplomatic
channels.2 76 Many countries, however, are unwilling to forego the
traditional dictates of international custom and diplomacy. 27 7 This
manpower is Zambia's attempt to control rhinoceros and elephant poaching in the Luangwa
Valley Game Reserve. The bush in and around the Reserve extends for 20,000 square miles,
and the park itself covers 6,500 square miles. Zambia's Save the Rhino Trust Fund is able to
provide twenty-two game wardens to cover this entire area. In practice, however, patrols are
limited to key areas in the southern portion of the park (120 square miles) while the entire
northern sector goes unpatrolled. Poachers, who account for two-thirds of all rhinoceros
deaths in the park, are nevertheless still able to operate even in the heavily guarded southern
zone. Of the seventy rhinoceri in the southern section, three of the five that have recently died
were killed by poachers. Cowell, On Foot Patrol in Rhinoceros Country, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5,
1983, at 2, col. 1.
271. The Jackass penguin and Blackfooted cape penguin (Spheniscus demersus) are cur-
rently listed in Appendix II. The Humbold penguin (S. humboldti) is currently listed in Ap-
pendix I.
272. Train, supra note 17.
273. Interview with Tom Striegler, supra note 194.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Sand, supra note 1.
277. Interviews with Linda McMahan, supra note 1.
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preference for customary over positive international law renders the
Secretariat's function as an immediate communication source a
nullity.
To facilitate communication the parties are required to keep na-
tional trade records on listed species and to submit annual and bien-
neal reports to the Secretariat. 27' These records and reports are
critical as they provide the Secretariat with sufficient data to discern
(1) weaknesses in CITES implementation processes, and (2) dis-
crepencies in interpretation among the parties. Recently the Secreta-
riat expressed great concern over the fact that less than one-third of
the parties had submitted their annual reports within the time speci-
fied. 2 79  These omissions are debilitating and the matter should be
addressed by the parties at the next Biennial Conference.
The effectiveness of CITES implementation is additionally ham-
pered by inefficient communication between parties as to their do-
mestic wildlife laws.28 When parties are not familiar with each
other's wildlife regulations it is often impossible to enforce the laws
and provide sufficient deterrence to illegal trade. 28 ' Even knowledge
of general trade bans can somehow escape acquisition by customs
inspectors. For example, many countries continue to accept wildlife
listed as originating in Brazil, despite the fact that Brazil has had a
total ban on all wildlife export since 1967.2
In the United States, the primary legislation under which illegal
wildlife trade is enforced is the Lacey Act.28 3 In 1981 Congress sig-
nificantly expanded both the scope and effect of the Lacey Act, which
now makes it a felony to violate any state, national or foreign wildlife
law.2 84 Most prosecutions of CITES violations in the United States
278. CITES, supra note 14, art. VIII(7).
279. Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Doc. 4.8.8.4.
280. Fuller, United States Enforcement of Wild Animal Import and Export Control, 5
TRAFFIC, 1983 Newsletter No. 1, at 8.
281. Interview with Don Carr, Chief of Wildlife Section, Land and Natural Resources Di-
vision, United States Department of Justice, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 6, 1984).
282. Law on the Protection of Fauna, LEI No. 5197, DIARIO OFFICIAL 19670105 (Jan. 3,
1967) cited in New Delhi Proceedings, supra note 57, Doc. 3.18 (ET-9). See also Train, supra
note 17, at 6.
283. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 3371-3378.
284. The Lacey Act provides, in pertinent part,
(1) Any person who-
(A) knowingly imports or exports any fish or wildlife or plant in violation of any
provision of this chapter..., or
(B) violates any provision of this chapter. . . by knowingly engaging in conduct
that involves the sale or purchase of, the offer of sale or purchase of, or the intent
to sell or purchase, fish or wildlife or plants with a market value in excess of $350,
knowing that the fish or wildlife or plants were taken, possessed, transported, or
Vol. 15
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are carried out under the Lacey Act.2 85 However, widespread igno-
rance of foreign wildlife law makes convictions under the Lacey Act
difficult. 286  Not only is it difficult for the Justice Department to
know which foreign laws, if any, are being violated, but proof of the
laws required for convictions in United States courts is often inacces-
sible.287 One recent case, for example, resulted in reversal of a con-
viction on appeal because of the government's inability to prove the
existence of the foreign law allegedly violated.288
In cases where foreign governments are cooperative in supplying
proof of their law, successful Lacey Act prosecutions are occurring.
For example, USFW recently seized two shipments containing 100
Blackpalm cockatoos at the port of Miami. 289 These specimens can
be purchased in Singapore for $600 apiece, and sell for $10,000 to
$20,000 apiece in the United States.2 90 The export permits listed the
birds as originating in Indonesia. 291 The Justice Department, how-
ever, was able to secure affadavits from Indonesian Officials testifying
that Indonesia has not allowed the export of these birds for many
years.29 2 This testimony provided sufficient documentation for the
forfeiture of the shipments. 93
The World Wildlife Fund recently sponsored a study of South
American wildlife laws. 294 This research should be extended to in-
clude the wildlife laws of all nations, so that eventually Party States
will have access to the trade restrictions which exist in all parts of the
sold in violation of, or in any manner unlawful under, any underlying law, treaty
or regulation, shall be fined not more than $20,000, or imprisoned for not more
than five years, or both ...
§ 3373(d)(1).
285. Interview with Don Carr, supra note 281.
286. Id.
287. The Lacey Act now contains a strict liability provision for forfeiture of wildlife prod-
ucts taken in violation of foreign law that would require only proof of the existence of the law
claimed as violated. 16 U.S.C.A. § 3374(a)(1).
288. U.S. v. 53 Eclectus Parrots, 685 F.2d 1131 (1st Cir. 1982).
289. U.S. v. 100 Blackpalm Cockatoos, Civ. No. 83-2679 JLK (S.D. Fla. 1983).
290. Interview with Don Carr, supra note 281.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. 16 U.S.C.A. § 3374 (a)(1) provides, in pertinent part,
All fish or wildlife or plants imported, exported, transported, sold, received, ac-
quired, or purchased contrary to the provisions of section 3372 of this title . . . or
any regulation issued pursuant thereto, shall be subject to forfeiture to the United
States notwithstanding any culpability required for civil penalty assessment included
in section 3373 of this title.
294. See K. FULLER & B. SWIFT, LATIN AMERICAN WILDLIFE TRADE LAWS (1984).
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world.295 Additionally, once the parties have catalogued the foreign
laws in force, weaknesses in certain areas will become apparent, and
harmonization of foreign law will be easier to achieve.296 For exam-
ple, one area demonstrably in need of harmonization is the legal pro-
cedure for confiscation and return of illegal shipments of wildlife.297
Many countries still allow those who illegally trade in endangered
species to receive pecuniary gain from disposal of seized shipments.
Parties could further CITES goals by attaining a harmony of law that
uniformly places the financial burden of confiscation and return on
the dealer of the illegally traded wildlife.298
2. Ineffective Deterrence to Illegal Trade. The second major
enforcement problem associated with CITES is the lack of effective
deterrence to violations of the Convention. In light of the high profit
potential of illegal wildlife trade there must be adequate deterrence to
ensure that the risk of capture outweighs the benefit of undetected
violation. Although many parties are making substantial numbers of
confiscations, the penalties imposed for illegal transport of wildlife
"are often woefully inadequate to offset the calculated risk the of-
fenders are taking. ' 299 The specific problems associated with penal
and monetary sanctions, confiscation and return of illegal shipments,
and lack of international harmony of wildlife trade laws create sub-
stantial obstacles to preventing over-exploitative wildlife trade.
The present penal and monetary sanctions imposed in most
countries for CITES violations are clearly inadequate. 3" For exam-
ple, in 1979 the Hong Kong Fur Factory Ltd. was fined for illegally
importing 319 cheetah skins (an Appendix I species) from Ethiopia
into Hong Kong. The consignment was valued at approximately
$44,000, but the total fine amounted to only $1,500.301 Prison
sentences are rare, and sometimes even those rendered "have been
described as derisory in proportion to the profits made., 3 2 For ex-
295. In the United States, for example, prosecutions under the Lacey Act would be greatly
facilitated if this information was available. Interview with Don Carr, supra note 281.
296. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 312-19.
297. See infra text accompanying notes 320-22.
298. Id.
299. Sand, supra note I, at 58.
300. Although the USFW successfully prosecuted sixty-five violators who were fined a total
of $156,000 in "Operation Snakescam," the profits these defendents stood to gain must be
considered when analyzing the deterrent effect of such convictions and sanctions. See COUN-
CIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 169 (1982).
301. INSKIPP & WELLS, supra note 5, at 26.
302. Sand, supra note 1, at 58.
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ample, in 1978 an eight month prison sentence and a $87,500 fine
was imposed for the illegal export of 2,500 American alligator skins
to France. The confiscated hides were valued at one million dollars.
Although the skins were worth approximately $400 each, the fine
was only $35 each.
3 3
In a few more flagrant cases this trend is being reversed. 3° In
U.S. v. Molt, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a prison
sentence of one year for conspiracy to smuggle twelve Radiated tor-
toises from Madagascar. 30 5 Another series of prosecutions involving
several hundred endangered birds resulted in prison sentences total-
ling eight years against one defendant. 30 6 Another defendant was sen-
tenced to one year for smuggling a single Loggerhead turtle.30 7
These stricter sanctions, however, are the exception rather than the
rule, and their deterrent effect is therefore questionable.30"
There is also some question as to the sufficiency of attention
USFW is devoting to international wildlife cases brought under the
Lacey Act. Since 1980 USFW has concentrated its attention almost
exclusively on domestic wildlife cases.30 9 To date, USFW has failed
to take the necessary administrative steps to insure successful imple-
mentation of the Lacey Act.3 '0  New regulations have not been
drafted to implement the 1981 amendments, and the designated ports
303. INSKIPP & WELLS, supra note 5, at 27.
304. Fried, Endangered Breeds: Curbing the Market, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1982, at 52, col.
2.
305. U.S. v. Molt, 599 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1979).
306. U.S. v. LaBlue, (C.D. Ca. 1980).
307. U.S. v. Meyers, (S.D. Tex. 1980).
308. The United States Department of Justice estimates that in recent months there have
been approximately six major international wildlife cases prosecuted. Interview with David
Carr, supra note 281. Prosecutions for violations of wildlife laws are still claimed to be inade-
quate. For example, The Department of the Interior recently came under direct attack by
United States District Court Judge Miles W. Lord for failure to prosecute "persons who ille-
gally kill an estimated 250 wolves each year in Minnesota." Judge Lord criticized the agency's
inaction in this regard as actually encouraging the destruction of the approximately 1,200 East-
ern timber wolves left in the lower forty-eight states. Earley, Federal Judge Defends Timber
Wolf, Wash. Post, Jan. 7, 1984, at A4, col. 1.
California and thirty-five other states have enacted legislation that is in some respects
tougher and more extensive than CITES or the ESA. The United States Supreme Court re-
cently upheld the right of states to embargo species not listed by CITES or the ESA. H.J.
Justin & Sons v. Dukemejian, 104 S. Ct. 91 (1983). For an interesting discussion of this issue,
see Note, Federal Preemption of State Commerce Bans Under the Endangered Species Act, 34
STAN. L. REV. 323 (1982).
309. Letter from Russell Train, President of World Wildlife Fund, to the Honorable Wil-
liam Clark, Secretary of the Interior (Dec. 7, 1983) (unofficial copy on file at California West-
ern International Law Journal).
310. Id.
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have not been provided with seizure or refusal standards.3 1
The lack of harmonization of domestic laws is another reason
deterrence against CITES regulations is lacking. Where some parties
adopt laws sufficient to provide a deterrent effect and exhibit a will-
ingness to enforce them, illegal trade is often shifted to countries
where the laws and enforcement are not as strong. Since the problem
of over-exploitative wildlife trade is a global one that requires an in-
ternational effort, successful implementation of CITES and a reduc-
tion of the illegal market cannot be achieved unless domestic wildlife
laws are harmonized.
Non-harmonization of foreign law is directly responsible for per-
mit laundering and illegal re-export of wildlife, two of the most sig-
nificant problems facing implementation of the treaty.312 Re-export
occurs when wildlife is smuggled from a country which prohibits its
trade into another country where it is not prohibited or where "paper
regulations" are not strenuously enforced.31 3 Laundering occurs
when CITES permits are altered to make this situtation appear legiti-
mate. To illustrate, prior to 1974 Peru and Columbia provided over
ninety percent of all neotropical primates to the United States.314 By
1974 both of these countries entirely banned primate trade. Panama,
which had never previously exported primates to the United States,
soon began exporting several hundred specimens a year, over half of
which were species not native to Panama.3"' The animals were
smuggled out of Columbia, a country which had enacted prohibiting
legislation, to Panama, which freely allowed their export. Fraudu-
lent export permits listed the animals as originating in Panama. The
effect of the laws of Columbia and Peru, therefore, was greatly mini-
mized because of the absence of restrictions in Panama. It was not
until the Panamanian government harmonized its export laws with
Columbia and Peru and prohibited export of primates that exploita-
311. Id.
312. Id. See also Mack Address, supra note 108; Train, supra note 17.
313. The Sudan, for example, has a population of fewer than 100 Northern white rhinoceri,
but nevertheless annually exports scores of horns. These horns are smuggled into the Sudan
and then re-exported with documentation claiming that the specimens were obtained from Su-
danese rhinoceri. See INNSKIPP & WELLS, supra note 5, at 23-24.
The prevelance of illegal laundering of elephant ivory is graphically illustrated by Burundi,
which "exported over 160,000 kilograms of ivory to Hong Kong and Japan in 1979 and 1980
combined. This represents about 10,000 elephants." Burundi has no elephant populations.
Mack Address, supra note 108.
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tive trade of these species was substantially curtailed.316
Today only Bolivia remains a major exporter of wildlife from
South America.317 Many of the shipments leaving Bolivia contain
species that are not native to that country, but are smuggled into
Bolivia and then re-exported via the laundering of CITES documen-
tation. For example, Bolivia's Hyacinth macaw population is known
to be approximately 500 birds. Nevertheless, Bolivia exported over
800 Hyacinth macaws to the United States in 1982.318 Wildlife such
as this is routinely smuggled across Brazil's immense Amazon border
and then re-exported from Bolivia.319 Until Bolivia's wildlife laws
and enforcement measures are harmonized with those of the other
South American countries, over-exploitative wildlife exporting will
continue to take place in that region of the world.
Confiscation of wildlife products traded in violation of domestic
law or CITES requirements also provides a deterrent effect. Once
specimens are confiscated, however, returning them to their native
country can create difficulties. This procedure is provided for by
CITES,3 20 but the practicalities of the expense involved present sig-
nificant problems. For example, Malaysian authortities recently con-
fiscated two live Asian elephants destined for Japan.321 The animals
had been illegally exported from Thailand and were returned there at
Thailand's expense.3 22 Many countries do not have the funds to han-
dle such costly expenditures, and as confiscations increase the prob-
lem is accentuated.
In an attempt to rectify this situation and place the burden of
meeting the cost of confiscation and return where it belongs, the Con-
ference at the Botswana Proceedings adopted a resolution providing
that "parties having not already done so make legislative provisions
to require that the guilty exporter and carrier meet the costs of con-
fiscation, cost, and return to the state of export. '3 23 The resolution
also called for parties to take steps to ensure that traders guilty of
Convention violations would not receive financial gain from the dis-




319. Hoge, Poachers Imperiling Wildlife in Brazil, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1981, at 3, col. 1.
320. CITES, supra note 14, art. VIII.
321. INSKIPP & WELLS, supra note 5, at 20.
322. Id.
323. Botswana Proceedings, supra note 32, Conf. 4.18.
324. Id.
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quiring traders to bear the costs of their violations, many parties have
actually allowed dealers in illegal wildlife cargo to receive pecuniary
gain from their contraband even after being caught. Disparities such
as this are a signal that the parties must step up efforts to
troubleshoot this and other hidden inconsistencies.
IV. CONCLUSION
International trade in endangered species represents a major
threat to their ultimate survival.325 Somewhat ironically, this illegal
trade also poses perhaps the single largest threat to legitimate trade
of non-endangered species, since defensive reaction to over-exploita-
tion restricts the overall international movemvent of all wildlife prod-
ucts.3 2 6 Over a decade ago CITES was established to protect the
interests of both conservationists and nations which depend upon
wildlife exports as a major source of revenue.3 27 The Convention has
enabled the international community to make substantial progress in
this regard,3 2' although success has been limited.
3 29
The major internal weakness of CITES as an international trade
and conservation mechanism is that it allows substantial trade ex-
emptions despite the fact that these exemptions compound the
problems that the Convention attempts to solve. 330 Allowance for
trade with non-parties, 331 as well as exemptions for specimens
claimed as tourist souvenirs332 or specimens too difficult to iden-
tify333 might have been originally necessary to attract signatories, and
were arguably justifiable since their negative effects were unknown.
Today, however, reliable data indicate that these provisions permit
significant over-exploitation to continue. The cautious steps that the
Parties have taken to correct these abuses suggest that they may be
unwilling to substantially alter the Convention's loopholes and ambi-
guities, but their general conscientiousness and recognition of the im-
pact of such weaknesses promises that this remains an open question.
The most critical problems encountered in implementing
CITES, however, are not traceable to the treaty itself, but to the at-
325. See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 22-32.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 33-41.
328. See supra note 107.
329. See supra note 115.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 121-229.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 133-59.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 160-88.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 189-229.
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tempts to enforce its provisions.33 4 The lack of effective communica-
tion between and within parties on such important matters as
permits, identification procedures and foreign laws are unfortunately
debilitating,335 and insufficient deterrence through domestic laws
makes curbing illegal trade particularly onerous.336 Although many
States are strengthening sanctions for violations of CITES, interna-
tional harmonization of domestic wildlife law is necessary to make
invidivdual efforts effective on the global scale.
To their credit the parties to the Convention have consistently
identified the major weaknesses hampering effective implementation
and enforcement of CITES.3 37 In most instances practical solutions
have been recommended by the parties and accepted by the Conven-
tion at the biennial meetings of the Conference. These resolutions,
however, are recommendations only and are not formally accepted as
binding agreements.338 The noncommittal nature of the resolutions
seriously weakens the force of the solutions they offer. On a practical
level, formally adopting the resolutions as legally binding provisions
of the treaty is a realistic option. Since the parties have in most cases
exhibited a good faith attempt to follow the resolutions, the willing-
ness to achieve the goals expressed therein has already been mani-
fested.33 9 Uniform commitment would only solidify this resolve and
prompt vacilating parties to conform. 3' An extraordinary meeting
of parties should be convened 34 1 to allow the parties the opportunity
to amend the Convention text to incorporate and thereby mandate
those resolutions applicable to present problems that have been previ-
ously adopted on a non-obligatory basis.,
CITES offers a practical mechanism by which a complex and
difficult international problem can be alieviated. The obstacles
preventing more efficient implementation of the treaty are substan-
tial, yet they are not insurmountable. It is for this reason, and in
334. See supra text accompanying notes 230-324.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 236-98.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 299-324.
337. See supra text accompanying notes 147-53, 176-82, 203-17, 248-51, 323-24.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 94-98.
339. Id.
340. Vacilation of parties over effective implementation of both CITES provisions and Con-
ference resolutions may be inferred from the often repetitive nature of Conference resolutions
themselves. Moreover, frequently Conference Resolutions simply reiterate the treaty's text,
and urge the parties to respect or conform to its provisions. See, e.g., New Dehli Proceedings,
supra note 57, Conf. 3.6 (urging parties to comply with Conference Resolution 2.12); Botswana
Proceedings, supra note 32, Conf. 4.12 (urging parties to comply with Article III regarding
tourist souvenir specimens).
341. See supra text accompanying notes 104-08.
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light of the Convention's achievements thus far, that CITES repre-
sents an unprecedented effort of international cooperation which may
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